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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes two U. S. Marine Corps permanent
change of station (PCS) policy alternatives that, if
initiated, could save millions of dollars. The analysis
examines the quantitative and qualitative effects of: (1)
increasing tour lengths for billets within the Continental
United States (CONUS) ; and, (2) increasing lengths of
unaccompanied overseas billet tours. Longer tours mean
fewer PCS moves and less expense: however, until now, no
formal analysis has gone beyond the "back of the envelope" to
find how much can be saved. A financial analysis of the
proposed policy changes finds that an unconstrained
implementation of the alternatives could reduce the U. S.
Marine Corps personnel budget by: (1) $13 million for longer
CONUS tours; and, (2) $34 million for longer unaccompanied
overseas tours. A PCS movement simulation using the Markov
Chain Model finds that extending the unaccompanied overseas
billet tours is a superior alternative to both current policy
and the proposed change to CONUS tours. However, statistical
analysis of data obtained from the 1993 Marine Corps Quality
of Life Survey infers that a longer unaccompanied overseas
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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the U. S. Marine
Corps permanent change of station (PCS) policy. The objective
of the analysis is to determine if the PCS budget can be
reduced without harming readiness. This thesis is important
to the Marine Corps because budgetary resources are declining,
and the Marine Corps can save millions of dollars by changing
PCS policy. This chapter will provide the following: PCS
background information; the research objectives and questions;
the scope and assumptions that define and constrain the
thesis; and the organization of the study.
B . BACKGROUND
The Marine Corps has approximately 177,000 active duty
military personnel permanently assigned to various duty
stations throughout the United States and around the world.
At these duty stations, Marines are either performing their
primary duties according to assigned "billets," or they are
receiving formal training (known as occupying "school seats")
.
As a billet or a school seat becomes vacant, a Marine is
ordered to fill the vacancy. Moving Marines from one duty
station to another is called a PCS move. The Marine Corps
Personnel Assignment Policy, Marine Corps Order 1300. 8P,
states that:
The policy of the Marine Corps is to limit PCS moves to
those required to achieve/maintain combat readiness or to
ensure equitable treatment and career development of
individual Marines. Compliance with this policy improves
combat readiness by controlling personnel turnover,
reducing travel cost, and increasing the stability of
Marine families. [Ref. l:p.2]
Therefore, the impact of this assignment policy on readiness
is a function of: efficient and effective staffing of
billets; career development of personnel; and morale.
Annual PCS -move costs are a substantial expense the Marine
Corps must pay from its military personnel budget. The Marine
Corps' Fiscal Year (FY) 1994 Budget projects that more than
$200 million will be spent on PCS moves. Minimizing personnel
movement costs has been a continuing concern within the Marine
Corps, Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, and
Congress. However, the annual PCS movement of some Marines is
unavoidable because vacancies occur when Marines: one,
complete their duty assignment (i.e., an overseas tour, drill
instructor duty, etc.); two, complete a formal school; three,
separate from the service; and, four, are reassigned to duties
that enhance their professional development (i.e., command,
joint tours, career level school, intermediate level school,
top level school, etc.). Consequently, personnel imbalances
are created requiring the movement of more Marines to balance




PCS moves are classified into six different categories:
accessions, separations, training, operational, rotational,
and unit. These PCS move categories are defined below. [Ref
.
2:p. 9]
1. Accession . Travel from place of enlistment or
commissioning (or from point of receipt of orders) to
first (or new) permanent duty station or training school
of 20 weeks or more. Attendance at flight training by
newly commissioned officers is considered an accession
move
.
2. Separation . Travel upon separation from a military
service between last permanent duty station and home of
record or point of entry into said military service,
including travel from overseas for the purpose of
separation.
3. Training . Travel within the 48 Continental United
States and the District of Columbia (CONUS) to and from
permanent duty station to training school of 20 weeks or
more. Excludes accession travel.
4. Operational . Travel within the CONUS to and from
permanent duty stations. Travel between permanent duty
stations overseas or between the CONUS and Canada or
Mexico, when transoceanic travel is not involved.
Excludes accession travel.
5. Rotational . Travel between CONUS and overseas permanent
duty stations or travel between permanent duty stations
overseas, if transoceanic travel is involved.
6. Unit . PCS movements in connection with the relocation
of an organized unit.
Marine Corps decision-makers establish the policies that
produce the PCS requirements for each of these move
categories
John T. Warner and Stanley A. Horowitz, in Geographic
Movement of Military Personnel: Issues and Policies ,
acknowledged the difficulties involved in changing existing
PCS policy. They stated:
The various categories of moves are interdependent. More
separations may necessitate not only more accession moves,
but also more training, operational and rotational moves.
But if it is unacceptable to military personnel, a policy
that tries to reduce rotational or operational moves may
ultimately cause an increase in separations, and moves due
to separation and accession may therefore increase. A
host of non-PCS policies- -where to locate the training
establishments, when to train personnel, the level of
reenlistment bonuses or retirement benefits, etc.-- affect
movement. [Ref. 3:p. 4]
Notwithstanding the complexities of changing PCS policy,
changes may be necessary to adjust to different requirements
and declining resources. Some PCS-move categories are less
compliant than others. Accession, separation, training, and
unit moves are a function of force structure end strength,
training requirements, and decisions made to optimally locate
units. These move categories are not directly influenced by
PCS policy changes. However, rotational and operational moves
are more likely to be directly affected by policy
modifications that change tour lengths. These policy
modifications can decrease or increase the frequency that
Marines perform rotational and operational moves.
Consequently, the Marine Corps' annual budget for PCS moves is
affected by rotational and operational tour length/PCS-move
policy decisions.
There are two types of rotational tours: accompanied and
unaccompanied (and this thesis is concerned with only those
tours at Okinawa and Iwakuni, Japan) . Upon request, most
officers and staff noncommissioned officers (Marines in grades
E-6 and above; also, some noncommissioned officers, E-5's, are
included in this group) are authorized to bring their families
with them when they PCS overseas. They then serve a three
-
year "accompanied" rotational tour. Also, married officers
and staff noncommissioned officers (SNCO's) can choose to
leave their families in the CONUS and serve a one-year
"unaccompanied" rotational tour. Unmarried Marines serve a
one-year rotational tour. Married Marines in the grades of
corporal (E-4) and below are not included in the accompanied
tour West Pacific (WESTPAC) staffing plan, and consequently
most serve a one-year unaccompanied rotational tour.
Therefore, the Marines serving in a rotational tour will have
either a three-year or one-year tour length, depending on
their rank, marital status and personal choice. The Marine
Corps encourages married officers and non-commissioned
officers to volunteer for the three-year, accompanied
rotational tour. However, the Marine Corps consistently fails
to meet its accompanied rotational tour staffing goal because
not enough Marines volunteer for the accompanied rotational
tour. [Ref. 4]
The policy governing operational tours sets the standard
length at three years. However, some operational tour billets
are so arduous that they are considered a hardship;
consequently, these billets have a two-year tour length.
The Marine Corps decision-makers consider the PCS program
to be a target for budget reduction because of the apparent
discretionary nature of rotational and operational PCS -move
policies. Changing rotational and operational PCS-move
policies would affect the frequency of moving Marines, and
consequently the demand for PCS funds. However, adjusting
tour lengths to reduce the PCS budget should be carefully
analyzed to ensure that the savings from a reduced PCS budget
are not offset by: (1) increases in requirements for other
types of funding, (2) negative impacts to morale that may lead
to lower retention (thereby increasing the number of





This thesis will analyze the advantages and disadvantages
of altering Marine Corps rotational and operational PCS-move
policies. The objective of this analysis is to enable Marine
Corps decision makers to select options that effectively
reduce the PCS budget without degrading readiness.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1 . Primary
What are the effects to the Marine Corps budget if:
one, unaccompanied rotational tour lengths are extended; and,
two, operational tour lengths are extended?
2.
Secondary A
Other than the fiscal effects to the budget, what
effect will extended unaccompanied rotational tour length have
on readiness?
3 . Secondary B
What effect will extended operational tour lengths
have on readiness and career development?
E. SCOPE
This study will be a manpower policy analysis that
examines the fiscal and qualitative factors of the proposed
rotational and operational move policy changes.
F. ASSUMPTIONS
In this study the assumption "ceteris paribus" will be
invoked for a fiscal examination of the alternatives.
Therefore, the number of accessions, separations, training,
and unit moves is assumed to remain the same during the
rotational and operational move analysis.
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter II provides a review of the literature that is
pertinent to the theoretical framework, of this thesis. First,
a discussion addresses the positive and negative effects of
extended unaccompanied tours. Then, the positive and negative
effects of extending operational tours is examined.
In Chapter III, a general overview of the Marine Corps
manpower process is presented to provide an understanding of
how billets and the demand for personnel are developed.
Chapter IV presents the data and methodology used in the
research design and structure of the analysis.
Chapter V presents and examines data for the fiscal and
quantitative analysis/interpretation of each alternative.





The purpose of changing the current rotational and
operational PCS -move policies is to save money without
decreasing readiness and career development. The proposed
policy changes in rotational and operational tour length/PCS
moves could both benefit and hurt readiness. In general,
longer tours decrease personnel turbulence. Fewer Marines
moving improves both unit cohesion and personnel stability.
This improves readiness. However, shorter tour lengths exist
because some billets and assignment locations are more arduous
than others. Extending tour lengths in these billets or at
these locations could hurt readiness. The purpose of this
chapter is to present an examination of studies that relate to
the two proposed policy changes.
B. ROTATIONAL TOUR LENGTH/PCS -MOVE POLICY
From a fiscal standpoint, increasing the unaccompanied
tour length from 12 months to 18 or 24 months would decrease
the PCS budget in three ways: one, the demand for accompanied
tours would increase (author's assumption); two, the turnover
of personnel on unaccompanied tours would be less and, three,
fewer operational moves would be needed to balance the force
due to fewer overseas pulls from CONUS billets. The next two
subsections will review the literature that addresses the
positive and negative effects of extending the unaccompanied
tour.
1. Positive Effects Of Longer Unaccompanied Tours
An extended unaccompanied tour improves unit readiness
in three ways. First, personnel turbulence is decreased.
Horowitz and Wagner discuss the benefits of longer tours in
their Geographic Movement of Military Personnel: Issues and
Policies . Changing from a 12 -month unaccompanied rotational
tour to a 24 -month tour would mean a substantial decrease in
personnel turnover every year. Consequently, the demand for
resources that are devoted to the training and orientation of
new personnel is decreased, and more resources can be directed
towards improving a unit's combat readiness [Ref. 3:p. 25].
Second, the Marines serve together longer. Marines function
as team members, and a longer tour could enhance unit
cohesiveness [Ref. 3:p. 19]. Research has shown that
longevity in assignments, particularly in key billets, has a
positive effect on individual and unit performance [Ref. 5:p.
15 and Ref. 6:p. 201] . The third positive effect is that more
officers and SNCO's may be encouraged to accept an accompanied
tour to avoid the longer unaccompanied tour and the
consequences of a longer family separation. Additionally, if
more Marines serve on accompanied tours there will be fewer
Marines serving on the shorter unaccompanied tour.
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Consequently, personnel turbulence is reduced further and unit
cohesiveness is further enhanced.
2. Negative Effects Of Longer Unaccompanied Tours
Longer unaccompanied tours may diminish personal
readiness. Personal readiness involves factors that affect an
individual's ability to perform his or her job and contribute
to the aggregate readiness of his or her unit. For example,
if a male Marine is deployed overseas and is separated from
his family, any marital or family strife that might require
his presence at home affects this Marine's "personal
readiness" and consequently his absence affects his unit's
readiness. Three impacts could harm a Marine's personal
readiness and indirectly affect combat readiness. They are:
(a) family separation, (b) spouses who work, (c) family
hardship.
a. Family Separation
Lengthening the unaccompanied tour aggravates the
negative effects that come from family separation. Research
has analyzed the effect of family separation on service
members and their families [Refs. 7, 8, and 9] . Studies show
that separating military personnel from their families creates
stress for the service member, thereby lowering the
individual' s productivity [Ref. 9:p. 27]. Thus, extending the
unaccompanied rotational tour will exacerbate the effects of
family separation and create a more powerful disincentive for
11
retention. Sources of a Marine's stress may be concern for
his or her family's welfare or just a lower morale borne from
missing the family. Additionally, spouses may strongly object
to family separations that are created as a matter of policy.
Research has shown that a spouse's support (or lack of
support) for the service member's military career has a direct
influence on the retention of high-quality personnel [Ref.
9:p. 29]. Frequent and/or lengthy family separations are
understood to be one of the reasons that personnel leave the
military service [Ref. 7:p. 56]. Therefore, the lower
individual productivity and retention rates that emanate from
excessive family separation hurts readiness.
b. Spouses Who Work
One of the primary reasons married officers and
SNCO's select the unaccompanied tour is that their spouses
work [Ref. 10]. Working spouses experience difficulty
relocating within CONUS every three years, but they cope
either by selecting employment positions that are readily
transferable or by accepting underemployment. Presumably,
Marines and their working spouses consider the twelve -month
unaccompanied rotational tour to be a more acceptable
alternative than the three-year accompanied rotational tour,
to preserving both careers.
However, one reason service members leave the
military is that their military career is incompatible with
12
their spouse's career [Ref. 7:p. 114]. If a spouse works,
there is a negative effect on the service member's retention
[Ref. 8:p. 43] . Therefore, a longer unaccompanied rotational
tour may harm Marine retention because both rotational tour
alternatives are unsatisfactory. These Marines' alternatives
are: one, accept the accompanied tour in which case the
Marine's spouse faces limited employment opportunities
overseas; or, two, accept the extended unaccompanied
rotational tour, which carries the negative family separation
impacts discussed in the previous section. Consequently,
retaining Marines may be more difficult and readiness could be
degraded.
c. Family Hardship
In 1993, 3,250 married officers and SNCO's on
accompanied tours were stationed in Okinawa, Japan. These
Marines were about sixty percent of the married officers and
SNCO's serving in Japan who were eligible for an accompanied
rotational tour. The remaining officers and SNCO's,
approximately 2,400 Marines, selected the unaccompanied tour.
If the assumption is correct that an extended unaccompanied
tour will encourage more officers and SNCO's to volunteer for
an accompanied tour, then it is prudent to consider some
pertinent questions. How well will these reluctant
volunteers, the Marines and their families, adjust to
relocating overseas? Under the present circumstances, a small
13
percentage of the Marine families overseas do not complete the
entire three-year accompanied rotational tour, but return
early to CONUS because of various hardship reasons (other than
medical) . Will the level of family attrition increase when
these additional volunteers - those families that would
otherwise prefer to stay in CONUS and accept their sponsor's
twelve -month unaccompanied rotational tour - relocate overseas
on an accompanied tour?
The U.S. Army sponsored a study by Gary L. Bowen
titled Family Adaptation to Relocation: An Empirical Analysis
of Family Stressors. Adaptive Resources. and Sense of
Coherence . This study considered the adaptive ability of Army
families to living overseas in foreign countries. Bowen
identified some significant factors that affected Army
personnel and their families.
Relocation to an overseas environment can result in
numerous hardships for military families, including
financial strains, geographic separation from extended
family, and difficulties associated with assimilation
to a new cultural setting. These hardships may pose
serious challenges to the family system, resulting in
a decreased level of family adaptation at the
personal, family, and Army-system level. [Ref. 11 :p.
17]
Studies have linked family adaptation with retention and
individual and unit readiness [Ref. 12 and 13] . Therefore, as
more officers and SNCO's choose the accompanied rotational
tour, the negative effects these Marines and their families
experience from locating overseas may reduce readiness and/or
increase the demand for PCS funds because: one, a Marine's
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productivity may decrease due to increased personal stress;
and, two, a higher rate of family attrition may result.
C. OPERATIONAL TOUR LENGTH/PCS -MOVE POLICY
A longer operational tour will reduce the number of
Marines that move every year and the PCS budget will be
diminished accordingly. Intuitively, a longer operational
tour seems to be a logical choice that could save money and
improve readiness; however, there are some negative effects,
too. The next two subsections will review the literature that
addresses the positive and negative effects of extending the
operational tour length.
1. Positive Effects
A longer operational tour improves readiness. In a
previous sub- section the positive effects of extending the
unaccompanied tour were discussed; and likewise, lower
personnel turbulence and enhanced unit cohesiveness may result
if the operational tour length is changed from three years to
four years. Unit readiness could be improved because
personnel turbulence is decreased and Marines serve together
longer. Also, a longer operational tour could increase
personal readiness by reducing the stress Marines and their
families experience from frequent relocation.
Research has shown that frequent relocation is another
reason service members leave military service [Refs. 7 and 8]
.
Consequently, increasing the operational tour length
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(decreasing the number of relocations/PCS) might be viewed
positively by Marines and their spouses, and could have a
beneficial impact on morale and retention. [Ref. 5:p. 21]
Therefore, a longer operational tour may encourage more
Marines to stay in the Marine Corps.
2 . Negative Effects
Longer operational tours could negatively affect the
career development and personal readiness of Marines. The
literature that addresses the potential negative effects of an
extended operational tour is limited. In August 1993, the
Manpower and Reserve Affairs Department, Headquarters, Marine
Corps published an information paper, 4 Year Tours . that
consolidated multi- departmental staff comments regarding a
four-year operational tour policy. The comments recorded in
this document highlight the drawbacks of lengthening all
operational tours. The following paragraphs will address the
negative effects that a four-year operational tour could have
on career development and personal readiness.
a. Career Development
A mandatory four-year operational tour will have a
harmful effect on the career development of Marines, and
consequently on readiness. A longer operational tour affects
the career development of officers and to a lesser extent of
some SNCO's. Horowitz and Warner stated,
. . .many in the services believe that in some
circumstances more frequent rotation, especially among
16
officers, enhances effectiveness over the long run
even when it detracts currently from individual job
performance or unit ef fectiveness
.
[Ref . 5:p. 20]
Generally, the consequence of fewer moves is fewer
opportunities for individual Marines to obtain important
factors of human capital (i.e., education, training,
experience)
.
The consensus among Marine Corps manpower experts is best
described by Brigadier General P. G. Howard:
The policy of a four-year tour should only be mandated
if career development and the needs of the Corps can
be accommodated while at the same time maintaining
family stability, operational readiness and meeting
tight budget constraints. [Ref. 14 :p. 2]
For the sake of equity and the good of the Marine Corps, all
Marines should be afforded the same opportunities of education
(professional military education, i.e., career, intermediate,
and top level schools) and experience (for officers: joint and
command tours; for enlisted: drill instructor and recruiter
duty) . Longer operational tours will decrease the number of
opportunities Marines have to be assigned to duties that
enhance their career, and consequently their education and
experience attainment. Overall, readiness could be decreased
because Marines might be less productive.
Jb. Personal Readiness
Some operational tour billets are more "difficult"
than others. The difficulty of a particular assignment may be
connected to higher work-related stress (i.e., drill
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instructor duty) or family separation (i.e., security duty
aboard a deployed ship) . At the same time, most of these
difficult assignments are considered career enhancing.
Therefore, the justification for keeping these types of
assignments at the current twenty four-month tour length are
two- fold: one, frequent moves in and out of these billets
allow more Marines the opportunity to obtain a particular
experience; and, two, Marines would not be subject to
hardships associated with a particular assignment for too long
[Ref . 3:p. 20] . Making these types of assignments a four-year




An understanding of the PCS program/policy can be enhanced
through a background discussion of the Marine Corps manpower
process because PCS is just one "cog" within the complex
manpower "machinery." In the Marine Corps, PCS program
management falls within the organizational responsibility of
the Manpower Department, Headquarters, Marine Corps. The
mission of the Manpower Department is to: provide the
appropriate number of adequately trained , sufficiently
experienced , usable Marines to the commander so that he/she
can accomplish his/her mission [Ref . 15:p. 1-1] . Section B of
this chapter will discuss how the Manpower Department
accomplishes this mission and how the PCS -move program fits
into the macro -manpower process.
B. MANPOWER PROCESS
The Manpower Department's mission was presented in the
previous section. Although this is a simple statement,
unfortunately, the process is complex. The manpower process
is actually a collection of subordinate processes that are
interdependent, interrelated, iterative, and completely




To determine personnel inventory requirements, it is
appropriate to begin with the requirement. "The National
Security Act of 1947 directed that there be a Marine Corps
consisting of three divisions and three air wings." [Ref.
15 :p. 1-2] The Marine Corps requirement for manpower resides
in this general guidance. These divisions and air wings
include subordinate commands that facilitate meeting the
requirement, as do many additional commands and organizations
that comprise the "supporting establishment" that sustains
them. Reality takes its toll when constraints affect
determining personnel requirements . This can be explained by
dividing this "requirement" discussion into four parts:
personnel inventory requirements, authorized strength
requirements, target inventory, and staffing goal.
1. Personnel Inventory Requirements
Each command has a "structure" composed of military
billets. These structures are reflected in Tables of
Organization (T/O's) that document/record the billets,
missions, and requirements of all commands and organizations.
Overall control of T/O's is coordinated by the Commanding
General, Marine Corps Command Development Center (Integration
Division) , with decentralized control and input from four
functional sponsors:
1. Commanding General, Marine Corps Command and Development
Center: Command Elements (Marine expeditionary forces,
brigades, and units)
20
2. Plans, Policies & Operations Department (PP&O)
,
Headquarters Marine Corps: Ground Combat Arms (infantry-
division organizations) and Marine Corps Bases
3. Installations & Logistics Department (I&L) , Headquarters
Marine Corps: Combat Service Support (service support
organizations) and Marine Corps Bases
4. Aviation Department, Headquarters Marine Corps:
Aviation Combat Element (aviation organizations) and
Marine Corps Air Stations
Manpower planners consolidate these T/O's into the Table of
Manpower Requirements (T/MR) . The T/MR represents the
structure that is designed to provide the personnel resources
needed to perform the Marine Corps' wartime mission. This T/0
consolidation is an unconstrained "personnel inventory"
requirement that consists of a total of about 209,000 billets.
The T/MR identifies the unconstrained personnel
inventory requirement that "should" exist during wartime.
During times of peace the Marine Corps personnel requirement
looks much different from what the T/MR portrays. During
peacetime, "fiscal constraints" limit the funding of the
Marine Corps personnel requirement to what can be "afforded."
For example, in FY 1993, the Marine Corps could afford only
179,000 Marines. The next step of the Manpower process is to




2 . Authorized Strength Requirements
Authorized strength requirements are formulated as a
product of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process.
The POM process allows manpower planners to allocate
constrained resources (money and Marines) to accomplish the
Marine Corps mission. Within the scope of the POM process,
the planning cycle encompasses a seven-year period: the
current year, the budget year (the next FY)
,
and the following
five years (the outyears) . Given the fiscal constraints, the
total personnel strength requirement (number of Marines that
can be afforded) is set for each fiscal year, and strength
levels are allocated to the structure sponsors.
The functional sponsors participate in a series of
committees: the POM Working Group, the POM Coordinating Group,
and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps Committee, to
produce their respective "Troop Lists." The Troop Lists
represent the Marine Corps' total personnel strength
requirement, and are the "cornerstone" of the manpower
requirements determination process. The Troop Lists identify
generic units with unit structure and unit manning - for
example, 27 infantry battalions containing "X" Marine officers
and "Y" Marine enlisted structure, to be manned with "Z"
Marine officers and "Q" Marine enlisted [Ref . 15 :p. 1-3] . The
Troop Lists are one of three inputs that produce the
authorized strength requirements.
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Manpower planners determine the authorized strength
requirement by combining the Troop Lists, the T/O's, and the
Unit File (a document that specifies manning levels for
specific units, i.e., Second Battalion, Fifth Marines) to
produce the Authorized Strength Report (ASR) . The ASR
represents the "manning" level for the Marine Corps (links the
Marine Corps personnel inventory to billets) , and is the input
that allows other manpower planners to produce two key
"targets": a target force and a staffing goal . Planners from
the Manpower Planning Division, Manpower Department use the
target force for manpower planning. Planners from the
Personnel Management Division, Manpower Department use the
staffing goal as a target for assignments (it is here that PCS
has its role). [Ref. 15:p. 1-4]
3 . Target Force/The Planning Process
The ASR allows manpower planners to produce a target
force for each fiscal year that represents an ideal personnel
inventory (as depicted in the ASR for those fiscal years)
.
The target force conforms to the "manning" levels portrayed in
the ASR and reflects the personnel inventory by grade and
occupational specialty. Also, it conforms to legal
requirements that dictate grade constraints (e.g. only "X"
percent of the force can hold a specific officer or enlisted
grade) . [Ref. 15:p. 1-5]
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The manpower planners' job is to use the target force
to build plans that shape the current personnel inventory into
next year's target force (as well as the outyears, the five
fiscal years following the budget year) . Shaping the
personnel inventory is extremely complex and requires detailed
planning. These are some of the planning areas:
• Officer and enlisted non-prior- service accession plans.
• Prior- service accession plans.
• Officer and enlisted skill-classification and training-
input plans.
• Overall -reenlistment and selective- reenlistment plans.
• Lateral -movement plan.
• Officer and enlisted promotion plans.
• The budget.
This process is a complicated manipulation of the "authorized
strength." The results of this process determine the
requirements/goals for accessions, training, promotions,
reenlistment, and lateral moves from one occupation specialty
to another. [Ref. 15:p. 2-3 and 2-4]
The target force "looks" different from the staffing
goal, just as the T/MR looks different from the ASR (the ASR
reflects the "fiscal" constraints on the personnel inventory)
.
The staffing goal is different because it incorporates another
personnel strength constraint. The Marine Corps has a
personnel "overhead" that includes a group of personnel who
are unavailable to any field command. This overhead is large
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and represents approximately fifteen percent of the total
Marines on active duty. These Marines are unavailable because
they fall into one of the following categories: trainees,
transients, patients, or prisoners (collectively called t2 P 2 ) .
For example, in FY 93 there were approximately 179,000 active
duty Marines, and T2 P 2 averaged approximately 25,000 Marines.
T2 P2 is a constant liability that cannot be eliminated.
Therefore, manpower planners produce a "staffing goal" (a
manning target that excludes T2 P 2 ) to facilitate personnel
assignments
.
4. Staffing Goal/The Assignment Process
Just as the target force related to the manpower
planning process, the staffing goal relates to the assignment
process. Staffing goals are the ideal grade-and-skill
distribution of the Marines that are in the current inventory.
The current inventory excludes T2 P2 Marines. Staffing goals
are produced based on the following list of inputs:
• The current inventory.
• The authorized strength targets for the next 6-9 months.
• A myriad of manpower policies and requirements.
Policy dictates that certain commands or parts of commands
have different "staffing precedence" than others. There are
three types of staffing precedence: "excepted" command -
staffed at 100 percent by skill and grade (no substitutions
for a similar specialty or lower grade) , "priority" command -
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staffed at 100 percent of authorized strength in "gross
numbers" (substitutions for similar specialties or lower
grades allowed) , and "proportionate share" command - commands
that bear the brunt of fluctuations in the personnel inventory-
dower manning levels). [Ref. 15:p. 1-8]
Staffing goals change continuously as they reflect
changes in the current inventory and authorized billet mix
(ASR) of each command. The staffing goal is a numerical
assignment target 6 to 12 months in the future that the
"assignment process" attempts to achieve. Using the staffing
goal, "monitors" (the personnel assignment officers and
SNCO's) transfer career and entry- level Marines, in compliance
with staffing priorities, to achieve the optimal distribution
of Marines. The Manpower Process , a handbook for manpower
managers, describes the assignment process as the following:
The assignment process is the monitor's attempt to match
specific Marines to the staffing goals of commands and,
where possible, meet the desires of the individual Marine.
The goal of the assignment process is to make the "best"
distribution of the existing inventory of assignable
Marines to the authorized billets we have decided to
staff --i.e., to place sufficient Marines by grade, skill,
and experience at each command to meet the staffing goals.
[Ref. 15:p. 1-8]
To support the monitors' assignment process, manpower
planners must develop and maintain a PCS -move plan. The PCS-
move plan is an important part of the POM and budget
processes. The PCS -move plan identifies the number of moves
required to support the assignment orders written by the
enlisted and officer monitors and the resources needed to
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execute the assignments. The outputs of the PCS -move plan
process are calculated estimates of fiscal year PCS -move
requirements for enlisted and officer personnel for the POM
years. [Ref. 15 :p. 2-9] These estimates are incorporated in
the budget and are reviewed/authorized by Congress.
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IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. OVERVIEW
This chapter contains three sections that present the data
and methodologies used to analyze the effects of longer
unaccompanied WESTPAC (rotational) tours and CONUS
(operational) tours. The first section discusses the data and
methodologies used to compute the budget savings that can be
achieved by changing the rotational and operational PCS
policies. The second section is an examination of the data
and methodologies used to simulate the PCS movement of
personnel within the current and proposed PCS policies. The
third section is a study of the data and methodologies used to
examine the effects an unaccompanied tour may have on married
Marines
.
B. PCS SAVINGS ESTIMATE
This section presents the data and methodology used to
estimate the savings that can be achieved by changing
rotational and operational PCS-move policy. This discussion
and the corresponding analysis in the next chapter address the
primary thesis research question:
What are the fiscal effects to the Marine Corps budget if:
(1) unaccompanied rotational tour lengths are extended and
(2) operational tour lengths are extended?
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This section is organized into two subsections: the data and
the savings estimate methodology.
1. The Data
The author used a variety of sources to obtain the
data used to produce the savings estimates. Marine Corps
commands provided the personnel data. Demographic information
was obtained from the Manpower Statistics For Manpower
Managers . PCS budget data was extracted from the Military
Personnel, Marine Corps Budget Justification Book .
Additionally, a great deal of information was obtained from
conversations with Marine Corps manpower analysts. This
subsection proceeds in two parts: the WESTPAC rotational PCS-
move data and the CONUS operational PCS -move data.
a. The WESTPAC Rotational PCS-Move Data
WESTPAC Marine Corps units at Marine Corps Air
Station, Iwakuni, Japan and Marine Corps Base, Okinawa, Japan
(Camps Schwab, Hansen, Courtney, Foster, Butler, Futema, and
Kinser) are the focus of this rotational PCS -move analysis.
As of January 1994, the combined Marine Corps personnel
strength in WESTPAC was about 1,334 officers and 14,897
enlisted Marines. The officer population was comprised of 813
married/accompanied officers and 521 married/unaccompanied and
single officers. The enlisted population was comprised of
2,846 married/accompanied Marines and 12,051 married/
unaccompanied and single Marines.
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Marines will be categorized into sub-populations
based on the following definitions (for the purposes of this
thesis) : first- tenners are Marines in the grades private (E-
1) through corporal (E-4) ; career enlisted force are Marines
in the grades sergeant (E-5) through master gunnery
sergeant/sergeant major (E-9) ; officers, include all warrant
officers (WO-1 through CWO-5) and commissioned officers (0-1
through O-10) . Given these definitions, some observations
about the WESTPAC Marine populations can be estimated by-
reviewing historical data. For example, first -term Marines
represent approximately 68 percent of the entire enlisted
population [Ref. 16:p. 5]. Also, the marital status of a
Marine sub-population can be estimated; for example,
approximately 80 percent of the career enlisted force is
married [Ref. 17 :p. 61] . Armed with the data provided in the
previous paragraph (i.e., accompanied, unaccompanied, and
single status) and statistics similar to those presented in






• Career Enlisted Force:
married/accompanied = 2 846






These quantities and other quantities similarly derived are
used to compute the savings estimate analysis in the next
chapter.
The rotational PCS costs used in this thesis are
derived from the Military Personnel, Marine Corps, Budget
Justification Book . Average rotational PCS costs are based on
the FY 1994 budget estimates. These average PCS costs are as
follows: officer equals $9,376 and enlisted equals $2,736.
The rotational PCS -cost estimates reflect an adjustment made
to exclude the expense for shipment of privately- owned
vehicles because Marines are not authorized to ship their cars
to Japan. It must be stated that using Marine Corps average
PCS-cost data is not ideal for this analysis. The author made
every effort to obtain more accurate data without success.
Using available average cost estimates skews some items in
this analysis. Ideally, the best cost estimates would be
those that differentiate between senior and junior officers,
married and single career enlisted force Marines,
unaccompanied first-term and single first-term Marines, etc.
The Marine Corps manpower budget section computes average
costs based on cost codes and computes an average based on
three years of costs divided by the total movers in each move
category. The Marine Corps has only one fiscal analyst
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assigned to PCS, and understandably she was not able to devote
the hours to segregate only WESTPAC data for this analysis.
Jb. The CONUS Operational PCS-Move Data
Operational PCS moves are the movement of career
officers and enlisted Marines within CONUS. First -term
Marines and junior officers do not perform an operational PCS
move unless they have obligated themselves for further service
subsequent to the expiration of their initial obligation.
Generally, this means that the enlisted Marine has reenlisted
and the junior officer is allowed to remain on active duty.
For officers, accepting orders that involve an operational PCS
move obligates them to continue their service for the duration
of their next assignment. In essence, these junior enlisted
Marines and officers join the career enlisted and officer
force.
The literature review discussed the negative
effects of longer CONUS tours. In that discussion, potential
harm to career development and personal readiness were cited.
There is considerable consensus among Marine Corps policy
analysts and decision makers that some billets should be
excluded from being changed to a longer tour length. In the
Manpower and Reserve Affairs Department, Headquarters, United
States Marine Corps, 4 Year Tours document, some officer and






These officer billets are listed in Table 4-1. The
row categories in this table identify the billet type and the
manning of this billet category. The column headings identify
the tour length for the specific billet. Each column is
summed and divided by the tour length to obtain an estimate of
the number of Marines in the category that will move every
year. The combined officer move requirement is 856.
TABLE 4-1 EXCLUDED OFFICER BILLETS
Billet 36 Months 24 Months
Marine Security Forces 91 12
Recruit Training Commands 326
Inspector, Instructor Staff:s 233
Combat Cargo Officer 53




Forward Air Controller 68





Moves per year 816 40
Total move per year requirement: 856 = 816 + 40
Table 4-2 lists the enlisted billets to be excluded
from the proposed tour extensions. The number of enlisted
Marines moving every year is estimated similarly to that for
Table 4-1. The enlisted move requirement for these billets is
2,159.
33
TABLE 4-2 EXCLUDED ENLISTED BILLETS












Moves per year 1579 580
Total move per year requirement : 2159 = 1579 + 580
The operational PCS costs and move frequencies used
in this thesis are derived from the Military Personnel, Marine
Corps Budget Justification Book .
2. The Savings Estimate Methodology
This subsection describes the methodologies used to
estimate the savings that can be achieved by changing: (1) the
rotational WESTPAC one -year tour to two years for
married/unaccompanied and single Marines and (2) the
operational (CONUS) three-year tour to four years. This
description proceeds in two parts: the WESTPAC rotational tour
length change and the operational tour length change.
a. The WESTPAC Rotational Tour Length Change
Increasing the rotational unaccompanied tour length
will reduce the number of Marines performing PCS moves and
reduce the PCS budget. Three options are discussed here and
are examined in the next chapter. First, a WESTPAC rotational
cost estimate is computed based on current PCS -tour- length
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policies; this is called the "status quo" option. Second, a
cost estimate is computed that incorporates changing all the
one-year tours to two-year tours. Third, a cost estimate is
computed that applies the tour length change only to first-
term Marines. Each cost estimate is computed using three
simple formulas.
Formula 1 computes the number of billets to be
filled. The number of billets to be filled equals the
staffing goal divided by the tour length, i.e., total number
of married/accompanied officers, 813, divided by the tour
length, three years, equals a billet fill requirement of 271
accompanied officers. This billet fill (BF) requirement is an
input to the next formula for computing the move requirement.
Formula 1. Billet Fill
Billet Fill (BF) = Staffing Goal/Tour Length
Formula 2 computes the move requirement. The
move requirement (REQ) equals the billet fill requirement,
minus 8 percent of the billet fill requirement, and then this
quantity is multiplied by two. Subtracting 8 percent of the
billet fill requirement provides an estimate for overseas
extensions net the number of short tours. Multiplying the
resulting requirement by two accounts for the Marines that are
inbound and outbound to the WESTPAC billet assignment. The
number of move requirements is an input for the next formula
that computes the number of personnel required to rotate.
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Formula 2 . Move Requirement
Move Requirement (REQ) = [BF - (.08*BF)]*2
Formula 3 computes the total number of
personnel required to be moved, rotating (ROT) . The number of
Marines rotating (ROT) equals the requirement, minus 6 percent
of accessions, and minus 8 percent of separations. The
element, 6 percent of accessions (total accessions into the
Marine Corps) , adjusts the REQ to exclude moves categorized as
an accession move. The element, 8 percent of separations
(total Marine Corps separations) , adjusts the REQ to exclude
the moves categorized as separations. Multiplying the
rotational moves (ROT) by the average PCS cost provides a PCS
cost estimate for that specific (officer or enlisted)
requirement
.
[Ref . 2:p. 25]
Formula 3 . Marines Rotating
Rotating (ROT) = REQ - .06*ACCESS - .08*SEP
Jb. The Operational Tour Length Change
Increasing the operational tour length from
three years to four years will decrease the PCS budget. Three
options are examined in the next chapter. First, an
operational move estimate incorporating current PCS policies
is computed; this is called the status quo option. Second, an
operational move estimate reflecting the tour length change
from three years to four years is computed. Third, an
operational move estimate reflecting the tour length change
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from three years to four years but excluding the billets
identified in Tables 4-1 and 4-2 is computed because longer
tours in these assignments may inflict unnecessary hardship on
a Marine or harm an individual Marine's career development.
The Military Personnel, Marine Corps Budget
Justification Book , provides operational PCS average costs
(officer is $9,218 and enlisted is $2,976) and move estimates
for fiscal years 1993, 1994, and 1995 (these estimates are
presented in the next chapter) . Three options are examined
using these average PCS costs and move estimates. First, a
three-year average is computed using these estimates, and the
resulting averaged estimate becomes the status quo move
requirement. The status quo move requirement is multiplied by
the average PCS cost to obtain the status quo PCS -cost
estimate. Second, the 1993, 1994, and 1995 operational move
estimates are summed and divided by four to compute a PCS -move
requirement that reflects a four-year operational tour length.
This move requirement is multiplied by the average PCS cost to
obtain this option's cost estimate. Third, the billets
identified for exclusion from the four-year tour length
adjustment are subtracted from the CONUS billet population.
The remaining billets are adjusted to a four-year tour. Next,
the requirements from Table 4-1 and Table 4-2 are added to the
adjusted move requirement, and this sum is multiplied by the
average PCS cost to produce this cost estimate.
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C. PCS -MOVE SIMULATION
This section presents the data and methodology used to
forecast the movement of personnel based on current and
proposed PCS policies. The purpose of conducting a move
simulation is to analyze how PCS policy affects the assignment
of Marines. This discussion and the corresponding analysis in
the next chapter will address the secondary thesis research
questions:
Other than the fiscal effects to the budget, what effect
will extended unaccompanied rotational tour lengths have
on readiness? And, what effect will extended operational
tour lengths have on readiness and career development?
The author uses the Markov Chain Model to simulate personnel
movement. This section is organized into two subsections: the
data and the Markov Chain Model
.
1. The Data
The author selected a population of Marines that
share the same Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) and rank.
Ground supply (MOS 3002) majors were selected for this
simulation. This population of 123 officers was organized
into categories based on their assignment status as follows:
• Overseas (WESTPAC only) accompanied three-year tour (WP/3)
• Overseas (WESTPAC only) unaccompanied one -year tour (WP/1)
• CONUS Fleet Marine Force (FMF) three-year tour (CF/3);
personnel assigned to an operational unit, i.e. an
infantry division or force service support group, etc.
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• CONUS supporting establishment three-year tour (CS/3);
personnel assigned to a Marine Corps base, Inspector and
Instructor staff, etc.
• Training two-year tour (T/2) ; personnel attending the
Special Education or Advanced Degree programs
• Training one-year tour; personnel attending intermediate
level school, i.e., U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff
School, U.S. Navy War College, etc.
Table 4-3 shows how the ground supply majors were
distributed among the specified categories as of January 1994
[Ref. 18]. The distribution, geographic location, tour
length, and occupational/school status are fundamental inputs
for simulating the effects PCS policy has on the assignment
process. The next subsection introduces the simulation model.
TABLE 4-3 GROUND SUPPLY MAJORS' DISTRIBUTION
WP/3: 9 CF/3: 59 T/2: 4
WP/1: 6 CS/3: 37 T/l: 8
2 . The Markov Chain Model
The Markov Chain Model (MCM) is a mathematical
description of how change can take place in a manpower system.
The MCM can be used by manpower planners to forecast what may
happen if assumed trends continue as they have been observed
in the past. It is a management tool that can serve as a
guide to achieve a desired objective. The purpose of this
subsection is to familiarize the reader with the
characteristics and capabilities of the MCM as it applies to
a personnel transfer system. This familiarization will
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proceed in two parts: the Markov elements and the Markov
formula [Ref . 19]
.
a. The Markov Elements
The MCM has the following characteristics:
• Discrete Time: Time is measured in discrete increments
(week, month, or year) . The MCM analysis in this thesis
uses one fiscal year as its time increment.
• Categorization: Personnel in an organization can be
classified into several mutually exclusive categories,
i.e., grades and ranks; length of service; geographic
location; profession or skill (such as MOS) ; or, some
combination of two (or more) of these examples. The
author categorized the ground supply majors by geographic
location, occupational or school assignment, and tour
length.
• Stocks: The quantity/distribution of personnel within the
categories at any given time. For example, the ground
supply majors' population totals 123 officers with nine
majors assigned to WESTPAC on accompanied tours (WP/3)
,
eight majors assigned to intermediate level school (T/l)
etc.
• Internal Flows : The personnel moving from one category to
another during a discrete time period. For example, if
nine majors are assigned to WP/3, a manpower planner could
forecast that three majors will move out of this category
during a fiscal year. This forecast is based on the
assumption that at the beginning of the discrete time
period: three majors were in the first year of their
assignment, three majors were in the second year of their
assignment, and three majors were in the third year of
their assignment.
• Attrition Flows: The personnel losses from a system to
the "outside world. " In the system of ground supply
majors, attrition occurs when personnel are promoted to
lieutenant colonel or separated from the Marine Corps.
• Recruitment Flows : The new personnel that enter a system
from the outside world. In a ground supply majors'
system, the new entries are the ground supply captains who
are promoted to major during the fiscal year.
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Additionally, the concept of steady state must
be introduced. When using the MCM, values for the personnel
distribution among the system's categories may stay the same
after the passage of successive time periods. In other words,
the "system" may achieve equilibrium where stocks do not
change
.
b. The Markov Formula
The MCM theory is based on empirical
observations that show personnel flows are proportional to
personnel stocks [Ref . 20:p. 96]. Table 4-4 gives a system
that has three categories with the transition proportions
between each category arranged in an array.
TABLE 4-4 SYSTEM ARRAY
Pll P12 Pl3 wl
P21 P22 P23 w2
P31 P32 P33 w3
The element, p i j (a generic representation of
Pll' P23' etc -) > is tne proportion of personnel in category "i"
at the beginning of a time period that move to category "j" by
the end of the period. W± is the proportion of the personnel
in category "i" that leave the system by the end of the
discrete time period. The Pi j ' s found in the array's diagonal
(i.e., p11# p22 » and p33 ) represent the proportion of personnel
that do not move out of the category during the discrete time
41
period. The Pij/Wi array is called a transition matrix, and
is represented by the symbol "P"
.
Formula 4 gives the MCM equation used in this
thesis. This equation assumes that total recruitment (all
entries into the system) is fixed for every discrete time
increment [Ref. 19:p. 7].
Formula 4 . MCM Equation
n(t) = n(t-l)P + R(t)r
Elements of the MCM equation are explained as
follows
:
• n(t) : Represents the stocks at the end of the discrete
time period, (t)
.
• n(t-l)P: Represents the stocks, (n) , at the beginning of
a discrete time period, (t-1) , multiplied by the
transition matrix (P) during the discrete time period,
(t) .
• R(t)r : Represents the total recruits, R, entering the
system during a discrete time period, (t) , multiplied by
the recruitment vector (r) . The recruitment vector
represents the proportion of total recruitment that is
distributed to each category.
A more detailed account of Markov models for manpower systems
is provided in D. J. Bartholomew's, Stochastic Models for
Social Processes .
D. WESTPAC ONE -YEAR TOUR EFFECTS
This section presents the data and methodology used to
analyze the effects a WESTPAC one-year tour has on
married/unaccompanied Marines. This discussion and the
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corresponding analysis in the next chapter will address the
secondary thesis research question:
Other than the fiscal effects to the budget, what effect
will extended unaccompanied rotational tour lengths have
on readiness?
The effects a one-year tour may have on married/unaccompanied
Marines are examined by using data obtained from a survey
instrument, the 1993 Marine Corps Quality of Life
Questionnaire. This discussion is organized into three
subsections: (1) survey description, (2) the data, and (3)
analysis methodology.
1. Survey Description
The 1993 Marine Corps Quality of Life Questionnaire
was created by Dr. Elyse W. Kerce, Navy Personnel Research and
Development Center (NPRDC) . Dr. Kerce designed the
questionnaire to support her Marine Corps Quality of Life
(QOL) Assessment Model research, a multi-year project being
conducted by the NPRDC on behalf of Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps . The Marine Corps has a number of programs whose
purposes are to improve the quality of life of Marines and
their families, and to provide support services to assist them
in coping with stresses of life in the Marine Corps [Ref.
21 :p. 1] . The funding of these programs represents a
substantial use of resources that the Marine Corps cannot
afford to misuse. In their interim report, Outcome Variables
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Used in the Marine Corps Quality of Life (OOP Model , Dr.
Kerce and Barrie Cooper, also of NPRDC, state:
Although the primary justification for such funding is
that it is "the right thing to do, " it has also been
implicitly understood that QOL programs should positively
affect recruitment, individual performance, and retention
of Marine personnel. A further presumption is that Marine
Corps readiness will be improved as a result of these
programs. [Ref. 21 :p. 1]
Responses to the 1993 Marine Corps QOL Questionnaire provide
the subjective and perceptual data needed for Dr. Kerce'
s
research to assess the relationships between programs and
desired organizational outcomes (i.e., performance, personal
readiness, and intention to reenlist)
.
2 . The Data
The 1993 Marine Corps QOL Questionnaire was
administered to more than 10,000 active duty Marines and 5,000
spouses during the second and third quarters of FY 1993 [Ref.
21 :p. 2] . The Marines were randomly selected and the sample
was stratified by pay grade and location. The questionnaire
contains well over a hundred questions that address
demographics and how the Marines feel about their: life as a
whole, residence, neighborhood, leisure/ recreation, health,
friends/friendships, marriage/intimate relationship, relations
with offspring, relations with relatives, income/standard of
living, job, self, and hassles/uplifts.
The author of this thesis selected four questions
from the survey instrument for the analysis. A demographic
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question was selected to divide the sample personnel into
three categories: married/accompanied by family,
married/unaccompanied by family, and single. A geographic
question was selected to allow the analysis to focus on only
the WESTPAC Marines. Then, the author selected two subjective
questions, depicted in Table 4-5 and Table 4-6, that likely
relate to the negative effects of longer unaccompanied tours,
as was discussed in Chapter II.
TABLE 4-5 LIFE AS A WHOLE
First, which point on the scale below best describes how








TABLE 4-6 CAREER INTENTIONS
Which of the following statements BEST describes your
career intentions at this time?
I intend to remain on active duty in the Marine Corps
until eligible for retirement.
I am eligible for retirement, but intend to stay.
I intend to stay in, but not until retirement.
I'm not sure what I intend to do.
I intend to leave the Marine Corps as soon as I can.
I intended to remain on active duty, but I am being
released due to reduction in force.
The literature supports the observation that
frequent and/or lengthy family separations are reasons Marines
choose to leave the Marine Corps. Also, family separation is
a source of stress for Marines, and stress can be a source of
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lower productivity and morale. Therefore, the Marines'
responses to the two survey questions (Tables 4-5 and 4-6) may
indicate that unaccompanied tours have a negative effect on a




This subsection describes the methodologies used to
analyze the unaccompanied one-year tour effects on married
Marines. This description will proceed in three parts: a
general description of hypothesis testing; the specific
hypotheses used to analyze the WESTPAC one -year tour; and, the
statistical analysis techniques.
a. Hypothesis Testing, the General Case
Inferential statistics are often used to make
decisions about the value of a population mean or proportion.
Inferential statistics are methods used to draw conclusions
about a population based on data taken from a sample of the
population [Ref. 22:p. 2]. One method of evaluating
inferential statistics is to perform a hypothesis test on the
test statistic (mean or proportion) . A hypothesis test, using
inferential statistics, is a statement that something is true
about a population (inferred by the statistics taken from a
sample of a population) [Ref. 22:p. 416].
Usually, there are two hypotheses in a
hypothesis test; one is called the null hypothesis and the
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other is called the alternative hypothesis. Weiss and
Hassett, Introductory Statistics , define the two hypotheses as
follows
:
• Null hypothesis: A hypothesis to be tested. We use the
symbol HQ to stand for null hypothesis.
• Alternative hypothesis: A hypothesis to be considered as
an alternate to the null hypothesis. We use the symbol Ha
to stand for alternative hypothesis.
Generally, the null hypothesis says that any variance (to an
inferential statistic) found in a population is due to chance
and not due to any statistically significant differences with
the population. The alternative hypothesis states a different
opinion about the population.
Choosing an alternative hypothesis depends on
and should reflect the purpose in performing the hypothesis
test [Ref . 22 :p. 417] . Table 4-7 gives a simple example of a
hypothesis test. Here, the null hypothesis postulates that
the mean value of some variable in sub-group one equals the
mean value of the variable in sub-group two (both sub-groups
belong to the same population) . The alternative hypothesis
submits that the mean value of sub-group one's variable is
different (does not equal) from the mean value of sub-group
two's variable. The purpose of this hypothesis test would be
to determine whether or not the null hypothesis should be
rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis.
TABLE 4-7 HYPOTHESIS TEST EXAMPLE
HQ : Meansubl = Meansub2
Ha : Meansubl * Meansub2
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After null and alternative hypotheses are
designed, a test statistic is computed to evaluate the null
hypothesis. This test statistic is computed from the sample
data and is compared to reference values that would indicate
if the null hypothesis were true. This comparison value is a
probability value (P-value) that interprets the validity of
the null hypothesis [Ref . 23 :p. 5] . A large P-value indicates
that it would not be unlikely to observe the value for the
test statistic if the null hypothesis were true. In other
words a large P-value indicates that the null hypothesis
cannot be rejected as possible. However, a small P-value
indicates that it would be unlikely to observe the value for
the test statistic if the null hypothesis were true.
Therefore, a small P-value indicates that the null hypothesis
is false [Ref. 22:p. 447].
The P-value can also be used to determine if
the test results are statistically significant. Statistical
significance refers to the probability of making a Type I
error. A Type I error is the probability of rejecting a true
null hypothesis. Traditionally, there are three acceptable
levels of risking a Type I error: 0.10 (moderately
significant), 0.05 (significant), and 0.01 (highly
significant) . Therefore, in designing a hypothesis test, a P-
value is selected based on a significance level (0.10, 0.05,
or 0.01); and when the data's test statistic compares
favorably with the P-value, the alternative hypothesis can be
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reasonably counted as true at the significance level used for
computing the P-value.
Jb. WESTPAC One -Year Tour Hypotheses
The scope of this analysis is limited to the
effects a WESTPAC one-year tour has on Marines. The
literature indicates that the family separation caused by one-
year unaccompanied tours might harm the performance,
retention, and morale of married Marines. The survey
performed with the 1993 Marine Corps Quality of Life
Questionnaire produced a data base with over 10,000 Marines.
In this data base are 607 Marines from WESTPAC. There are 40
officers (grades W-l through 0-6) , 200 career enlisted (grades
E-5 through E-9) , and 367 first-term enlisted (grades E-2
through E-4, serving in their first enlistment). For the
analysis, these Marines are separated by pay grade into three
groups: officer, career enlisted force, and first-term
Marines. Each of these groups will represent a population.
The data for these populations will provide the statistics
that infer the behavior of all officers, career enlisted, and
first -term enlisted serving in WESTPAC. The remainder of this
subsection describes the two hypotheses.
(1) Quality of Life. Table 4-5 presented the
question that asked Marines how they felt about their life as
a whole. Table 4-8 gives the hypotheses developed based on
the Marines' responses to this question. The null hypothesis
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is that the mean values for "life as a whole" are equal for
Marines who are: married/accompanied by dependents,
married/unaccompanied by dependents, and single. The
alternative hypothesis is that the mean values between these
subgroups are significantly different. This test is performed
on each of the following populations: WESTPAC first- term
Marines, WESTPAC career enlisted force, and WESTPAC officers.
The purpose of this test is to find out if the data supports
the inference that married/unaccompanied Marines view
their life as a whole differently when compared to
married/accompanied and single Marines.
TABLE 4-8 LIFE AS A WHOLE HYPOTHESES
H : Meanacc = Mean^^ = Meansgl
Ha : Meanacc * Meanunacc * Meansgl
(2) Intent to Stay in the Marine Corps. Table
4-6 presented the question that asked the Marines to reflect
their intent to stay (past their current obligation) in the
Marine Corps. Table 4-9 gives the hypotheses developed based
on the Marines' responses to this question. The null
hypothesis is that the mean values for "intent to stay in the
Marine Corps" are equal for married/accompanied, married/
unaccompanied, and single Marines. The alternative hypothesis
is that the mean values between these subgroups are
significantly different. This test is performed on each of
the populations. The purpose of this test is to ascertain
whether the married/unaccompanied Marines' intent to stay in
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the Marine Corps is different when compared to married/
accompanied and single Marines.
TABLE 4-9 INTENT TO STAY IN THE U. S. MARINE CORPS
HQ : Meanacc = Mean^^ = Meansgl
Ha : Meanacc * Meanunacc g Meansgl
c. The Statistical Analysis
This thesis performs a statistical analysis of
the data obtained from the 1993 Marine Corps Quality of Life
Questionnaire. The data obtained from this survey instrument
is analyzed based on the hypotheses developed in the previous
subsection. The purpose of performing these hypothesis tests
is to infer the effects a WESTPAC one-year unaccompanied tour
has on married Marines. The statistical tools used for this
analysis are bivariate and statistical significance analysis.
(1) Bivariate Analysis . Data that involve two
characteristics of the members in a sample are called
bivariate. The next chapter contains bivariate data tables
that show the frequency and relative frequency of the
responses to the survey questions. This presentation provides
an opportunity to observe how the married/accompanied,
married/unaccompanied, and single Marines' responses differ.
(2) Statistical Significance Analysis. In a
statistical test that compares different groups within a
population, the hypotheses are tested by partitioning the
total variation in the data into variation due to differences
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between groups and variation due to error. The error
variation does not refer to mistakes in the data but to the
natural variation within a group and variation due to other
factors that are not considered in the hypothesis test. This
thesis uses a statistical computer program, SAS, to analyze
the data. SAS has an "analysis of variance" procedure called
ANOVA that analyzes variation in data. The ANOVA test
provides information on statistically significant differences
of paired groups. Additionally, a post hoc test is required
to identify which group means are statistically different
among several groups [Ref. 23:p. 8].
The post hoc test used in this thesis is
the TUKEY test. The TUKEY test is designed for pairwise
comparisons between different groups of a population when the
groups are of a different size. The TUKEY test can determine
when two means are considered significantly different, and
allows the analyst to reject the null hypothesis of equal
population means. [Ref. 24 :p. 944]
For this thesis, the ANOVA and TUKEY
procedures are performed using SAS. The ANOVA test will
identify when there is a statistically significant difference
between married/accompanied, married/unaccompanied, and single
Marines. The TUKEY test will isolate the possible difference




The previous chapter described the data and methodologies
used to perform the analysis. The purpose of this chapter is
to present the analysis results that can lead to conclusions
about the budget savings and readiness impacts of changing the
operational and rotational PCS policies. In the first
section, the financial data analysis is examined to determine
if budget savings can be gained by changing PCS policy. The
second section studies the Markov Chain Model analysis that
simulates the movement of personnel within the current and
proposed PCS policies. The final section examines the
statistical analysis of the effects an unaccompanied tour may
have on married Marines
.
B. PCS SAVINGS ESTIMATE
This section analyzes the savings that can be achieved by
changing Marine Corps tour length/PCS policy. The purpose of
this analysis is to compare current PCS policy costs to
proposed PCS policy costs. The corresponding section in the
previous chapter introduced the data and analysis
methodologies. This section presents the analysis in three
parts: (1) the WESTPAC tour length change analysis; (2) the
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operational tour length change analysis; and, (3) the analysis
review.
1. The WESTPAC Rotational Tour Length Change Analysis
This subsection analyzes the effect changing the
WESTPAC one -year tour to a two-year tour has on the Marine
Corps PCS budget. In this analysis three PCS -cost estimates
are computed. First, a WESTPAC rotational PCS -cost estimate
is computed based on current PCS tour length policies; this is
called the "status quo" option. Second, a PCS-cost estimate
is computed that incorporates changing all the one-year tours
to two-year tours. Third, a PCS-cost estimate is computed
that applies the tour length change only to first -term
Marines
.
a. Status Quo PCS-Cost Estimate
PCS-cost estimates that represent the current
policy are presented in this section. The current PCS policy
establishes a three -year tour for married/accompanied Marines
and a one-year tour for married/unaccompanied and single
Marines. This presentation will proceed in three parts: (1)
a PCS-cost estimate for officers; (2) a PCS-cost estimate for
enlisted Marines; and, (3) a PCS-cost estimate review.
(1) Officer PCS-Cost Estimate. The move require-
ment is estimated by computing the accompanied three -year tour
requirement separately from the unaccompanied/single one -year
tour requirement. In Table 5-1, using Formulas 1, 2, and 3,
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the officer rotations are estimated. This rotational move
requirement, 1,229, is used to compute the officer rotational
PCS- cost estimate.
TABLE 5-1 OFFICER ROTATIONS ESTIMATE
Formula 1 :
Billet Fill (BF) = Accomp Staffing Goal/Tour Length
271 = 813/3
Billet Fill (BF) = Unaccomp Staffing Goal/Tour Length
521 = 521/1
Total Billet Fill: 792 = 271 + 521
Formula 2 :
Move Requirement (REQ) = [BF - (.08*BF)]*2
1457 = [792 - (.08*792)]*2
Move Requirement (REQ) = 1457
Formula 3 :
Rotations (ROT) = REQ - .06*Access - .08*Sep
1229 = 1457 - .06*1348 - .08*1841
Rotations = 1229
In Table 5-2, the officer rotational PCS-cost
estimate is computed. The officer rotational PCS-cost
estimate equals $11.5 million.
TABLE 5-2 OFFICER ROTATIONAL PCS -COST ESTIMATE
Rotational PCS -Cost Estimate (EST) = ROT*Average PCS Cost
EST = 1229*$9376
EST = $11.5 million
(2) Enlisted PCS-Cost Estimate. The enlisted move
requirement is estimated using the same methodology as in the
previous section. In Table 5-3, using Formulas 1, 2, and 3,
the enlisted Marine rotations are computed. The rotational
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move requirement, 17,749, is used to compute the enlisted
rotational PCS- cost estimate.








= Unaccomp Staffing Goal/Tour Length
= 12051/1
Total Billet Fill : 13000 = 949 + 12051
Formula 2
:
Move Requirement (REQ) = [BF - (.08*BF)]*2
23920 = [13000 - (. 08*13000) ] *2




REQ - .08*Access - . 10*Sep
23920 - .08*33464 - .10*34938
Rotations = 17749
In Table 5-4 the enlisted Marine rotational
PCS -cost estimate is computed. The enlisted rotational PCS-
cost estimate equals $48.5 million.
TABLE 5-4 ENLISTED ROTATIONAL PCS -COST ESTIMATE
Rotational PCS -Cost Estimate (EST) = ROT*Average PCS Cost
EST = 17749*$2736
EST = $48.5 million
(3) PCS -Cost Estimate Review. The status quo
officer and enlisted WESTPAC rotational PCS- cost estimates
added together equal $60 million. This sum will be compared
with subsequent PCS -cost estimates.
56
b. All One -Year Tours Change to Two -Year Tours
This section presents the PCS -cost estimates that
reflect the proposed PCS policy: all of the one-year tours
change to two-year tours. This presentation will proceed in
three parts: (1) a PCS -cost estimate for officers; (2) a PCS-
cost estimate for enlisted Marines; and, (3) a PCS -cost
estimate review.
(1) Officer PCS -Cost Estimate. The move require-
ment is estimated by computing the accompanied three-year tour
requirement separately from the unaccompanied/single two-year
tour requirement. In Table 5-5, using Formulas 1, 2, and 3,
the officer rotational move requirement is computed. The
rotational move requirement, 751, is used to compute the
officer rotational PCS- cost estimate.
TABLE 5-5 OFFICER ROTATIONS ESTIMATE
Formula 1 :
Billet Fill (BF) = Accomp Staffing Goal/Tour Length
271 = 813/3
Billet Fill (BF) = Unaccom Staffing Goal/Tour Length
261 = 521/2
Total Billet Fill: 532 = 271 + 261
Formula 2 :
Move Requirement (REQ) = [BF - (.08*BF)]*2
979 = [532 - (.08*532)]*2
Move Requirement (REQ) = 979
Formula 3 :
Rotations (ROT) = REQ - ,06*Access - .08*Sep
751 = 979 - .06*1348 - .08*1841
Rotations = 751
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In Table 5-6, the officer rotational PCS- cost
estimate is computed. The officer rotational PCS -cost
estimate equals $7 million.
TABLE 5-6 OFFICER ROTATIONAL PCS -COST ESTIMATE
Rotational PCS-Cost Estimate (EST) = ROT*Average PCS Cost
EST = 751*$9376
EST = $7 million
(2) Enlisted PCS-Cost Estimate . The enlisted move
requirement is estimated using the same methodology as in the
previous section. In Table 5-7, using Formulas 1, 2, and 3,
the enlisted rotations are computed. This rotational move
requirement, 6,663, is used to compute the enlisted rotational
PCS -cost estimate.









= Unaccomp Staffing Goal/Tour Length
= 12051/2
Total Billet Fill : 6975 = 949 + 6026
Formula 2
Move Requirement (REQ) = [BF - (.08*BF)]*2
12834 = [6975 - (. 08*6975) ] *2




REQ - .08*Access - .10*Sep
- 12834 - .08*33464 - .10*34938
Rotations = 6663
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In Table 5-8 the enlisted rotational PCS -cost
estimate is computed. The enlisted rotational PCS -cost
estimate for this option equals $18.2 million.
TABLE 5-8 ENLISTED ROTATIONAL PCS-COST ESTIMATE
Rotational PCS -Cost Estimate (EST) = ROT*Average PCS Cost
EST = 6663*$2736
EST = $18.2 million
(3) PCS -Cost Estimate Review. By changing the one-
year tour to a two-year tour, the officer and enlisted PCS-
cost estimates summed equal $25.2 million. This reflects a
$34.8 million savings compared to the status quo cost estimate
(which was $60 million)
.
c. First-Term Marines Only
This section presents the PCS -cost estimates that
reflect the proposed PCS policy: one-year tour change to two-
year tour for first- term Marines only. This presentation will
proceed in three parts: (1) the officer PCS-cost estimate; (2)
a PCS-cost estimate for enlisted Marines; and, (3) a PCS-cost
estimate review.
(1) Officer PCS-Cost Estimate. This PCS-cost
estimate equals the status quo officer cost estimate because
there are no tour length changes for officers in this option.
Therefore, the officer PCS-cost estimate is the same $11.5
million that was computed in Table 5-4.
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(2) Enlisted PCS -Cost Estimate. This PCS policy-
affects only the first- term Marines. Therefore, three
enlisted tour length categories exist within this option: (1)
accompanied career enlisted force Marines serving on three
-
year tours, (2) unaccompanied or single career enlisted force
Marines serving on a one -year tour, and, (3) unaccompanied and
single first-term Marines serving on the two-year tour.
Approximately 32 percent of the enlisted force is comprised of
career force Marines, and conversely the first -term enlisted
comprise 68 percent of the enlisted force. Therefore, Table
5-9 gives a population estimate for the WESTPAC accompanied
career enlisted force, unaccompanied or single career enlisted
force, and first -term enlisted force. The accompanied career
enlisted force is 2,846; this quantity was provided by the
WESTPAC commands. The unaccompanied or single career enlisted
force is equal to 1,921 based on the estimated total WESTPAC
career enlisted force population of 4,767. The first- term
enlisted force of 10,130 is based on 68 percent of the WESTPAC
enlisted population (14,897).
TABLE 5-9 WESTPAC ENLISTED POPULATION BREAKDOWN
WESTPAC Enlisted Population = 14897
Career enlisted Force: .32* 14897 = 4767
Accompanied Career Enlisted Force = 2846
Unaccompanied or Single Career Enlisted Force:
4767 - 2846 = 1921
First-Term Enlisted Force: .68*14897 = 10130
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The enlisted move requirement is estimated
using the same methodology as in previous sections. However,
in this case the requirements are computed for three enlisted
categories. In Table 5-10, using Formulas 1, 2, and 3, the
enlisted Marine rotations are computed. The rotational move
requirement, 8,429, is used to compute the enlisted rotational
PCS-cost estimate.
TABLE 5-10 ENLISTED ROTATIONS ESTIMATE
Formula 1 :
Billet Fill (BF) = Accomp Staffing Goal/Tour Length
949 = 2846/3
Billet Fill (BF) = Unaccomp Staffing Goal/Tour Length
1921 = 1921/1
Billet Fill (BF) = First-Term Marines/Tour Length
5065 = 10130/2
Total Billet Fill: 7935 = 949 + 1921 + 5065
Formula 2 :
Move Requirement (REQ) = [BF - (.08*BF)]*2
14600 = [7935 - (. 08*7935) ] *2
Move Requirement (REQ) = 14 600
Formula 3 ;
Rotations (ROT) = REQ - . 08*Access - .10*Sep
8429 = 14600 - .08*33464 - .10*34938
Rotations = 8429
In Table 5-11 the enlisted rotational PCS-cost
estimate is presented. The enlisted rotational PCS-cost
estimate for this option equals $23 million.
TABLE 5-11 ENLISTED ROTATIONAL PCS -COST ESTIMATE
Rotational PCS -Cost Estimate (EST) = ROT*Average PCS Cost
EST = 8429*$2736
EST = $23 million
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(3) PCS-Cost Estimate Review. By changing the one-
year tour to a two-year tour, for the first-term Marines only,
the officer and enlisted PCS-cost estimates summed equal $34.5
million. This is a $25.5 million savings compared to the
status quo cost estimate (which was $60.0 million).
2 . The CONUS Operational Tour Length Change Analysis
This subsection analyzes the effects that changing the
operational three-year tour to a four-year tour would have on
the Marine Corps PCS budget. In this analysis three PCS-cost
estimates are computed. First, an operational PCS-cost
estimate is computed based on current PCS tour length
policies; this is called the "status quo" option. Second, a
PCS-cost estimate is computed that incorporates changing all
the three-year tours to four-year tours. Third, a PCS-cost
estimate is computed that excludes applying the tour length
change to the billet assignments identified in Table 4-1 and
Table 4-2 because of the potential harm to a Marine's career
development and personal readiness.
a. Status Quo PCS-Cost Estimate
This section presents the PCS-cost estimate that
represents the current policy. The current operational PCS
policy dictates a standard three-year tour length for career
officers and enlisted Marines. This presentation proceeds in
three parts: (1) an officer PCS-cost estimate, (2) an
enlisted Marine PCS-cost estimate and, (3) a PCS-cost review.
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(1) Officer PCS -Cost Estimate. The move
requirement is estimated by taking a three-year average of the
officer operational moves based on Marine Corps move
estimates for fiscal years 1993, 1994, and 1995. In Table 5-
12 the officer operational moves are estimated. The officer
move quantity equals 1,860, and this quantity is used to
compute the officer operational PCS budget estimate [Ref.
16:p. 87]
.
TABLE 5-12 OPERATIONAL MOVE ESTIMATES




5579/3 = 1860 Moves
In Table 5-13 the officer PCS budget estimate
is computed. The status quo officer operational PCS -cost
estimate equals $17.1 million.
TABLE 5-13 OPERATIONAL PCS -COST ESTIMATE
Budget Estimate = Officer Moves*$9219
$17.1 million = 1860*$9219
(2) Enlisted PCS -Cost Estimate. The enlisted move
requirement is estimated using the same methodology as in the
previous section. In Table 5-14 the enlisted Marine moves are
computed. The enlisted Marine move quantity equals 11,357,
and is used to compute the enlisted Marine operational PCS
budget estimate [Ref. 16:p. 88].
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TABLE 5-14 OPERATIONAL MOVE ESTIMATES





In Table 5-15 the enlisted PCS budget estimate
is computed. The status quo enlisted rotational PCS- cost
estimate equals $33.8 million.
TABLE 5-15 OPERATIONAL PCS -COST ESTIMATE
Budget Estimate = Enlisted Moves*$2976
$33.8 million = 11357*$2976
(3) PCS-Cost Estimate Review. The status quo
officer and enlisted operational PCS -cost estimates added
together equal $50.9 million. This sum is compared with
subsequent operational PCS -cost estimates.
b. Four-Year Tour PCS-Cost Estimate
This section presents the PCS -cost estimate that
represents the proposed PCS policy: all three-year tours
change to four-year tours. This presentation proceeds in
three parts: (1) an officer PCS-cost estimate, (2) an enlisted
Marine PCS-cost estimate and, (3) a PCS-cost estimate review.
(1) Officer PCS-Cost Estimate . The officer move
requirement is estimated by computing the status quo two-year
tour billets separately from the three-year tour billets to
avoid any flaws in the results. Table 5-16 gives the two-year
tour billet move requirement recomputed relative to the
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results in Table 4-1. The column is summed and divided by the
new four-year tour length to obtain the new operational move
estimate for these billets. The new estimate, 20, is added to
the move estimate in Table 5-17.
TABLE 5-16 TWO-YEAR BILLET MOVE ESTIMATE
Billet 24 Months
Marine Security Forces 12
Forward Air Controllers and Air Officers 68
Total 80/4yrs
Moves per year 20
In Table 5-17, an officer move estimate that
reflects the change to a four-year tour is computed. The
officer move quantity equals 1,385, and is used to compute the
officer operational PCS budget estimate.
TABLE 5-17 OPERATIONAL PCS -MOVE ESTIMATE
FY Operational Move Estimates minus Two-year Billets:
1993: 1915 - 40 = 1875
1994: 1832 - 40 = 1792
1995: 1832 - 40 = + 1792
5459/4 = 1365




In Table 5-18 the officer PCS budget estimate
is computed. The four-year tour officer operational PCS- cost
estimate equals $12.8 million.
TABLE 5-18 OPERATIONAL PCS -COST ESTIMATE
Budget Estimate = Officer Moves*$9219
$12.8 million = 1385*$9219
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(2) Enlisted PCS -Cost Estimate . The enlisted move
requirement is estimated using the same methodology as in the
previous section. Table 5-19 gives the enlisted two-year tour
billet move requirement recomputed relative to the results in
Table 4-2. The new estimate, 290, is added to the move
estimate in Table 5-20.
TABLE 5-19 TWO-YEAR BILLET MOVE ESTIMATE
Billet 24 Months
Drill Instructor Duty 1108
Combat Cargo Duty 52
Total 1160/4
Moves per year 290
In Table 5-20 an enlisted move estimate is
computed that reflects the change to a four-year tour. The
enlisted Marine moves equal 8,3 73, and are used to compute the
enlisted Marine operational PCS budget estimate.
TABLE 5-2 OPERATIONAL PCS -MOVE ESTIMATE




11858 - 580 = 11278
10407 - 580 = 9827
11807 - 580 = +11227
32332/4 = 8083




In Table 5-21 the enlisted Marine operational
PCS budget estimate is computed. The four-year tour enlisted
Marine operational PCS- cost estimate equals $24.9 million.
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TABLE 5-21 OPERATIONAL PCS -COST ESTIMATE
Budget Estimate = Enlisted Moves*$2976
$24.9 million = 8373*$2976
(3) PCS -Cost Estimate Review. The four -year tour
officer and enlisted Marine operational PCS- cost estimates
added together equal $37.7 million. This reflects a $13.2
million savings compared to the status quo cost estimate
(which was $50.9 million).
c. Four-Year Tour PCS-Cost Estimate With Exceptions
This section presents the PCS-cost estimate that
represents the proposed PCS policy: all three-year tours
change to four-year tours except those billets in which career
development and personal readiness might be harmed. This
presentation proceeds in three parts: (1) an officer PCS-cost
estimate, (2) an enlisted Marine PCS-cost estimate and, (3) a
PCS-cost estimate review.
(1) Officer PCS-Cost Estimate. The officer move
requirement is estimated by separating the billets identified
in Table 4-1 from the mover population, adjusting the mover
population to a four-year tour estimate, and then adding the
excepted movers to the four-year tour estimate. Table 5-22
gives the officer move estimate that reflects the change to a
four-year tour. The officer move quantity equals 1,609, and
this quantity is used to compute the officer operational PCS
budget estimate.
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TABLE 5-22 OPERATIONAL PCS -MOVE ESTIMATE
FY Operational Move Estimates minus Table 4-1 Moves
1993: 1915 - 856 = 1059
1994: 1832 - 856 = 976
1995: 1832 - 856 = + 976
3011/4 = 753




In Table 5-23 the officer PCS budget estimate
is computed. This four-year tour officer operational PCS -cost
estimate equals $14.8 million.
TABLE 5-23 OPERATIONAL PCS -COST ESTIMATE
Budget Estimate = Officer Moves*$9219
$14.8 million = 1609*$9219
(2) Enlisted PCS -Cost Estimate. The enlisted move
requirement is estimated using the same methodology as in the
previous section. Table 5-24 gives the enlisted Marine move
estimate that reflects the change to a four-year tour
excluding the billets listed in Table 4-2. The enlisted
Marine move quantity equals 9,058, and this quantity is used
to compute the enlisted Marine operational PCS budget
estimate.
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TABLE 5-24 OPERATIONAL PCS -MOVE ESTIMATE




11858 - 2159 = 9699
10407 - 2159 = 8248
11807 - 2159 = + 9648
27595/4 = 6899




In Table 5-25 the enlisted Marine operational
PCS budget estimate is computed. The four-year tour enlisted
Marine operational PCS- cost estimate equals $27 million.
TABLE 5-2 5 OPERATIONAL PCS -COST ESTIMATE
Budget Estimate = Enlisted Moves*$2976
$27 million = 9058*$2976
(3) PCS-Cost Estimate Review. The four-year tour
officer and enlisted Marine operational PCS-cost estimates
added together equal $41.8 million. This reflects a $9.1
million savings compared to the status quo cost estimate
(which was $50.9 million).
3. The Analysis Review
The analysis indicates that the PCS budget can be
reduced by extending tour lengths, thereby reducing the PCS-
move frequency. This general result was expected. The
purpose of this analysis was to determine the savings
magnitude, and it appears that substantial savings can be
achieved by changing any one of the proposed options. The
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rotational and operational PCS -move analysis results are
discussed in the next two subsections.
a. Rotational Move Analysis Results
Three rotational PCS policy options were analyzed:
the status quo, change all one -year tours to two years, and
change first-term Marine tour lengths only. Table 5-26
summarizes the results from the analysis.
TABLE 5-26 ROTATIONAL PCS -MOVE SAVINGS SUMMARY
Option Cost ($M) Savinas ($M)
Status Quo 60 .0
All 1- YTS Tour to 2 -Yrs 25 .2 34. 8
All 1- 5frs Tour to 2 -Yrs for
First -Term Marines Only 34 .5 25. 5
As can be observed, changing all the one -year tours
to two years yields the most savings, $34.8 million. The
reader should be reminded that some variance in the analysis
may exist because averaged rotational PCS costs were used.
Using an average PCS cost might be appropriate if the
reduction in PCS moves were evenly distributed throughout the
officer, enlisted, married/accompanied, married/unaccompanied,
and single Marine populations. However, this is not the case;
the policy change affects the least costly Marines the most,
the first termers. Consequently, the move reductions
predominately affect single and unaccompanied first- term
Marines whose actual PCS costs are probably less than the
average cost used in the analysis. Therefore, the cost
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savings in this analysis are probably inflated. More accurate
cost data is needed to improve the accuracy.
Jb. Operational Move Analysis Results
Three operational PCS-move policy options were
analyzed: the status quo, four-year tours for all, and four-
year tours with exceptions. Table 5-27 summarizes the results
from the analysis.
TABLE 5-27 OPERATIONAL PCS -MOVE SAVINGS SUMMARY














Relative to the rotational PCS move analysis, these
savings are smaller. However, both options offer sizable
savings compared to the current policy (status quo) . One
potentially inherent flaw in this analysis is the question:
Is a four-year operational tour feasible? The answer to this
question is pursued in the next section.
C. PCS MOVE SIMULATION ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the movement of personnel by using
the Markov Chain Model. The purpose of this analysis is to
compare the assignment effects of current and proposed PCS
policies. The hypotheses are:
• Increasing the WESTPAC (rotational) unaccompanied tour
length from one year to two years will reduce personnel
shortages and overages in the entire ground supply majors'
system.
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• However, increasing the duration of the CONUS
(operational) tours will exacerbate personnel shortages
and overages in the ground supply majors' system.
For this analysis, the Marine population introduced in the
previous chapter, ground supply majors, will be analyzed. This
section is divided into three subsections: (1) the
assumptions, (2) the system design, and, (3) the analysis
review.
1. Assumptions
The Markov Chain Model analysis will show that
different PCS policies affect the flow and distribution of
ground supply majors. However, some assumptions are necessary
to insure that the observed effects are controlled, that is,
the scope of the analysis is limited to the hypothesis
criteria. The assumptions are:
• The total number of ground supply majors remains constant
at 123.
• The current distribution of ground supply majors is the
desired objective: WP/3 = nine, WP/1 = six, CF/3 = fifty-
nine, CS/3 = thirty- seven, T/2 = four, T/l = eight. This
means that the end stocks, n(t) , should equal the
beginning stocks, n(t-l), and implies that the system is
in steady state.
• Attrition (w^ of ground supply majors remains constant.
For this simulation, 12.2 percent of the majors leave each
category per fiscal year. This equates to approximately
fifteen majors a year who are promoted to lieutenant
colonel or are separated from the Marine Corps.
• Recruitment, R(t)r, of ground supply majors remains
constant. This refers to the total number and
proportional distribution of ground supply captains who
are promoted to major each fiscal year.
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• The recruitment and attrition quantities are equal.
Therefore, approximately fifteen majors, proportionally-
distributed, enter and leave this system's population. By
making this assumption, the total population can be
controlled and maintained at 123 majors. Also, changes in
category distribution are controlled for recruitment and
attrition.
Presented with these assumptions and the data from the
sample population, the MCM can predict the effects that
current and proposed policies may have on the distribution of
the ground supply majors' population.
2. System Design
Within this subsection three alternatives are designed
to reflect current and proposed PCS policy "systems." First
is the current policy (the status quo) where there are: three-
year accompanied WESTPAC tours, one -year unaccompanied WESTPAC
tours, three-year CONUS FMF tours, three-year supporting
establishment tours, two-year school tours, and one-year
school tours. Second is the proposed rotational move policy
(WESTPAC) change, where there are: three -year accompanied
WESTPAC tours, two-year unaccompanied WESTPAC tours, three
-
year CONUS FMF tours, three-year supporting establishment
tours, two-year school tours, and one-year school tours.
Third is the proposed operational move policy (CONUS) change,
where there are: three -year accompanied WESTPAC tours, one-
year unaccompanied WESTPAC tours, four-year CONUS FMF tours,
four-year supporting establishment tours, two-year school
tours, and one-year school tours.
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In Chapter IV, the Markov Chain Model equation was
presented: n(t) = n(t-l)P + R(t)r. Based on the assumptions
discussed in the previous subsection, all elements of this
equation except the transition matrix (P) and end stocks are
controlled and constant. The P matrix reflects the
differences among the three alternatives because the tour
lengths in one or more of a system's categories are different.
Consequently, if one alternative maintains the desired
distribution of ground supply majors better than another
alternative, this indicates a better fit (produces the desired
equilibrium) between category stocks and tour lengths.
a. Status Quo Alternative
The transition matrix for the status quo
alternative is exhibited in Table 5-28. The top and left
margins identify the different categories. There are two CF/3
categories. The CF/3 category was split in half to control
for the ground supply majors who may move from one CF/3
location to another CF/3 location (i.e., Camp Pendleton, CA to
Camp Lejeune, NC) . The same is true of the CS/3 category.
However, the other categories are not represented twice
because PCS moves beginning in these categories never end in
the same category. Additionally, as a matter of policy, moves
between WP/3 and WP/1 do not occur; and moves between T/2 and
T/l do not occur.
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TABLE 5-28 STATUS QUO TRANSITION ' MATRIX
WP/3 WP/1 CF/3 CF/3 CS/3 CS/3 T/2 T/l Attrition
WP/3 .585 .081 .078 .052 .049 .011 .022 .122
WP/1 .244 .236 .154 .146 .033 .065 .122
CF/3 .028 .019 .585 .091 .060 .057 .013 .025 .122
CF/3 .028 .019 .093 .585 .059 .056 .013 .025 .122
CS/3 .025 .017 .084 .082 .585 .051 .011 .023 .122
CS/3 .025 .017 .084 .081 .053 .585 .011 .022 .122
T/2 .036 .024 .118 .115 .075 .071 .439 .122
T/l .071 .048 .237 .229 .150 .143 .122
Table 5-29 presents a conservation of flow diagram
that represents the effects of the status quo alternative
after the first fiscal year transpires when using the MCM.
The numbers within the matrix come from the probabilities in
Table 5-28 multiplied by the beginning stocks in Table 5-29.
For example, the number of majors who move from WP/3 to T/l
(the "cell" that represents the intersection of the WP/3 row
and T/l column) equals the corresponding probability from
Table 5-28, .022, multiplied by the WP/3 beginning stock, 9,
or .198 "stocks" in the T/l category after one fiscal year
passes. Summing the categories horizontally gives the
beginning stocks, which are listed along the right-side
margin. Summing the categories vertically gives the ending
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stocks (listed along the bottom margin) after the passing of
one fiscal year. Changes to the distribution of ground supply
majors are reflected by comparing the ending stocks to the
beginning stocks. With a MCM computer program, MARKOV,
multiple fiscal year manipulations of the MCM can be performed
[Ref
. 25:p. 32] .
TABLE 5-29 STATUS QUO CONSERVATION OF FLOW
Beginning
WP/3 WP/1 CF/3 CF/3 CS/3 CS/3 T/2 T/l Attrition Stocks
Recruits 1 1 4 4 2 2 1
WP/3 5.265 .729 .702 .468 .441 .099 .198 1.098 9
WP/1 1.464 1.416 .924 .876 .198 .390 .732 6
CF/3 .84 .57 17.55 2.73 1.80 1.71 .39 .75 3.66 30
CF/3 .812 .551 2.697 16.965 1.711 1.624 .377 .725 3.538 29
CS/3 .475 .323 1.596 1.558 11.115 .969 .209 .437 2.318 19
CS/3 .45 .306 1.512 1.458 .954 10.53 .198 .396 2.196 18
T/2 .144 .096 .472 .46 .30 .284 1.756 .488 4
T/l .568 .384 1.896 1832 1.20 1.144 .976 8
End 9.554 3.23 31.916 31.121 20.472 19.578 4.227 2.896 15.006
Stocks at at at at at at at at at
10 3 32 31 20 20 4 3 15
Table 5-30 reflects the "steady state" for this
policy alternative; using MARKOV a steady state was achieved
after the fourth fiscal year passed.
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TABLE 5-30 STATUS QUO STEADY STATE DISTRIBUTION
WP/3 WP/1 CF/3 CF/3 CS/3 CS/3 T/2 T/l
10 3 31 31 21 20 4 3
The status quo's performance is demonstrated by
comparing the beginning stocks in Table 5-29 to the steady-
state stocks in Table 5-30. Shortages are observed in the
WP/1, and T/l categories, where the number in steady state is
less than the beginning stock. Also, overages are observed in
the WP/3, CF/3 and CS/3 categories, where the number in steady
state is greater than the beginning stock.
Jb. WESTPAC Alternative
The WESTPAC transition matrix is exhibited in Table
5-31. The WESTPAC transition matrix is different from the
status quo transition matrix because the WESTPAC unaccompanied
tour length has increased to two years. In Table 5-31, only
the horizontal WP/2 line has changed when compared to the
status quo transition matrix (Table 5-28)
.
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TABLE 5- 31 WESTPAC TRANSITION MATRIX
WP/3 WP/1 CF/3 CF/3 CS/3 CS/3 T/2 T/l Attrition
WP/3 .585 .081 .078 .052 .049 .011 .022 .122
WP/2 .439 .122 .118 .077 .073 .016 .033 .122
CF/3 .028 .019 .585 .091 .060 .057 .013 .025 .122
CF/3 .028 .019 .093 .585 .059 .056 .013 .025 .122
CS/3 .025 .017 .084 .082 .585 .051 .011 .023 .122
CS/3 .025 .017 .084 .081 .053 .585 .011 .022 .122
T/2 .036 .024 .118 .115 .075 .071 .439 .122
T/l .071 .048 .237 .229 .150 .143 .122
Table 5-32 presents a conservation of flow diagram
that presents the WESTPAC effects after the first fiscal year
transpires in this manual MCM manipulation. The end stocks
are listed along the bottom margin. The change to the
distribution of ground supply majors is observed by comparing
the end stocks to the beginning stocks.
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TABLE 5-32 WESTPAC CONSERVATION OF FLOW
WP/3 WP/1 CF/3 CF/3 CS/3 CS/3 T/2 T/l Attrition
Beginning
Stocks
Recruits 1 1 4 4 2 2 1
WP/3 5.265 .729 .702 .468 .441 .099 .198 1.098 9
WP/2 2.634 .732 .708 .462 .438 .096 .198 .732 6
CF/3 .84 .57 17.55 2.73 1.80 1.71 .39 .75 3.66 30
CF/3 .812 .551 2.697 16.965 1.711 1.624 .377 .725 3.538 29
CS/3 .475 .323 1.596 1.558 11.115 .969 .209 .437 2.318 19
CS/3 .45 .306 1.512 1.458 .954 10.53 .198 .396 2.196 18
T/2 .144 .096 .472 .46 .30 .284 1.756 .488 4





















Using the computer model, a steady state is
achieved after the fourth fiscal year is run, Table 5-33. The
performance of the WESTPAC alternative is demonstrated by
comparing the beginning stocks in Table 5-32 to the steady
state stocks in Table 5-33. The T/l category has the only




TABLE 5-33 WESTPAC STEADY STATE DISTRIBUTION
WP/3 WP/2 CF/3 CF/3 CS/3 CS/3 T/2 T/l
10 6 31 20 20 19 4 3
c. CONUS Alternative
The CONUS transition matrix is exhibited in Table
5-34. The CONUS transition matrix is different from the
status quo transition matrix because the CONUS (CF and CS)
tour length has increased to four years. In Table 5-34, the
horizontal lines, CF/4 and CS/4, have changed compared to the
status quo transition matrix.
TABLE 5-34 CONUS TRANSITION MATRIX
WP/3 WP/1 CF/4 CF/4 CS/4 CS/4 T/2 T/l Attrition
WP/3 .585 .081 .078 .052 .049 .011 .022 .122
WP/1 .244 .236 .154 .146 .033 .065 .122
CF/4 .021 .014 .659 .068 .045 .042 .010 .019 .122
CF/4 .021 .014 .070 .659 .044 .042 .009 .019 .122
CS/4 .019 .013 .063 .061 .659 .038 .008 .017 .122
CS/4 .019 .013 .062 .060 .040 .659 .008 .017 .122
T/2 .036 .024 .118 .115 .075 .071 .439 .122
T/l .071 .048 .237 .229 .150 .143 .122
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Table 5-35 presents a conservation of flow diagram
that presents the effects of the CONUS policy alternative on
the distribution of majors after the first fiscal year
transpires. The changes to this distribution are reflected
along the bottom margin when compared to the beginning stocks.
TABLE 5-35 CONUS CONSERVATION OF PLOW
WP/3 WP/1 CF/3 CF/3 CS/3 CS/3 T/2 T/l Attrition
Beginning
Stocks
Recruits 1 1 4 4 2 2 1
WP/3 5.265 .729 .702 .468 .441 .099 .198 1.098 9
WP/1 1.464 1.416 .924 .876 .198 .390 .732 6
CF/4 .63 .42 19.77 2.04 1.35 1.26 .30 .57 3.66 30
CF/4 .609 .406 2.03 19.111 1.276 1.218 .261 .551 3.538 29
CS/4 .361 .247 1.197 1.159 12.521 .722 .152 .323 2.318 19
CS/4 .342 .234 1.116 1.08 .72 11.862 .144 .306 2.196 18
T/2 .144 .096 .472 .46 .30 .284 1.756 .488 4
T/l .568 .384 1.896 1.832 1.20 1.144 .976 8
End 8.919 2.787 32.674 31.800 20.759 19.807 3.91 2.338 15.006
Stocks = r\t ^ *S/ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
9 3 33 32 21 20 4 2 15
Using the computer model, Table 5-36 shows that
steady state is achieved after the third fiscal year is run.
This alternative's performance is demonstrated by comparing
the beginning stocks in Table 5-35 to the steady state stocks
in Table 5-36. Shortages are observed in the WP/3, WP/1, and
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T/l categories. Overages are observed in the CF/4 and CS/4
categories
.
TABLE 5-3 6 CONUS STEADY STATE DISTRIBUTION
WP/3 WP/1 CF/4 CF/4 CS/4 CS/4 T/2 T/l
8 3 33 32 21 20 4 2
3. The Analysis Review
Earlier in this section, the author hypothesized that
increasing the duration of WESTPAC unaccompanied tours will
reduce personnel shortages and overages in the ground supply
majors' system. Also, that longer CONUS (operational) tours
will exacerbate personnel shortages and overages. The
analysis results are summarized in Table 5-37. This table
presents this system's beginning distribution and steady state
stocks for the three PCS policy alternatives. The
parenthetically enclosed numbers adjacent to the steady stocks
reflects the percent difference between that personnel stock
compared with the beginning distribution stocks. Along the
bottom margin, the best performing alternative in each
category is noted. "Best" is defined as the smallest
difference or the closest quantity to the desired
distribution.
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TABLE 5-37 CATEGORY DISTRIBUTION PERFORMANCE
WP/3 WP/unacc CF/3 or 4 CF/3 or 4 CS/3 or 4 CS/3 or 4 T/2 T/l
Beginning
Stocks 9 6 30 29 19 18 4 8
Status Quo 10(111) 3(50) 31(033) 31(069) 21(105) 20(111) 4(0.0) 3(625)
WESTPAC 10(111) 6(0.0) 31(033) 30(034) 20(.052) 19(.056) 4(0.0) 3(625)
CONUS 8(111) 3(.50) 33(10) 32(103) 21(105) 20(.lll) 4(0.0) 2(75)
Performance Tie WESTPAC CONUS k
WESTPAC
Tie
WESTPAC WESTPAC WESTPAC Tie CONUS k
WESTPAC
Tie
For every category, the WESTPAC alternative is the
best performing alternative or is tied with one or both of the
other alternatives for having the least variation compared to
the beginning distribution. The status quo alternative is the
next best and the CONUS alternative is the worst.
D. WESTPAC ONE-YEAR TOUR ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the effects a WESTPAC unaccompanied
one-year tour has on married Marines. The purpose of this
analysis is to determine if there is a statistically
significant difference between married/accompanied,
married/unaccompanied, and single WESTPAC Marines in how they
view their life as a whole (LAAW) and in their intent to stay
in the Marine Corps (past their current obligation) . The
previous chapter presented the data and analysis
methodologies. This section presents the analysis in three
parts: (1) the quality of life; (2) the intent to stay in the
Marine Corps; and, (3) the analysis review.
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1. The Quality of Life
This section analyzes the effect a WESTPAC
unaccompanied tour has on the way a married Marine views
his/her life as a whole. The hypothesis test for this
analysis is presented in Table 5-38. The null hypothesis is
that the mean values for "how the Marine views his or her life
as a whole" are equal for married/accompanied, married/
unaccompanied, and single Marines. The alternative hypothesis
is that the married/unaccompanied Marine's mean value is
different from that of the married/accompanied and single
Marines. The WESTPAC Marines are divided into first- term
enlisted, career enlisted force, and officer populations.
These three population groups are analyzed separately using
the bivariate, ANOVA, and (as required) TUKEY procedures.
TABLE 5-38 LIFE AS A WHOLE HYPOTHESES
H : Meanacc = Meanunacc = Meansgl
Ha : Meanacc g Mean^^ * Meansgl
a. First-Term WESTPAC Marines
There are 349 first -term WESTPAC Marines in the QOL
data set. In Table 5-39, these Marines are grouped in a
bivariate contingency table that stratifies the Marines by two
characteristics, their accompanied/unaccompanied/single status
(left margin) and "how they view their life as whole" (top
margin) . The "mostly pleased, " "pleased, " "and delighted"
columns, summed, present the relative frequency (proportion)




unaccompanied (UNACC) , or single
(SGL) status. The parenthetically enclosed number is the
quantity of Marines for that particular row category
(ACC/UNACC/SGL) . The ACC subgroup has a 77.8 percent
frequency (summing: mostly pleased - 38.9 percent, pleased -
38.9, and delighted - 0.0) of viewing their LAAW positively,
to some extent, the UNACC subgroup has a 53.7 percent
frequency, and the SGL subgroup has a 49.5 percent frequency.




















































































Note: Quantities for each cell appear in parentheses ().
The ANOVA test results are presented in Table 5-40.
This analysis of variance procedure indicates that there is no
statistically significant difference between the three
subgroups in how the ACC/UNACC/SGL Marines view their LAAW.
A statistical significance would be portrayed by an F Value
(the test statistic) of approximately 5.0 or higher and a Pr
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> F of 0.05 or lower (the probability of making a Type I
error) . In this case, the F Value, 1.92, is too low to
indicate a statistical significance. Also, the Pr > F is too
high, meaning that if the null hypothesis is rejected, there
is a .1489 probability that rejecting the null hypothesis is
a mistake. Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected,
and this means that there is no significant difference between
married/accompanied, married/unaccompanied, and single WESTPAC
first -term Marines in the way they view their LAAW. The TUKEY
procedure is not performed because the ANOVA procedure has
indicated that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.






Square F Value Pr > F
Model 2 7.54611479 3.77305740 1.92 0.1489
Error 346 681.70316887 1.97024037
Corrected Total 348 689.24928367
R-Squara C.V. Root MSE LIFEWH1 Mean
0.010948 31.18235 1.4036525 4.5014327
Source DF Anova SS Mean Square F Value Pr > P
STATUS 2 7.54611479 3.77305740 1.92 0.1489
b. Career Enlisted WESTPAC Marines
There are 182 career enlisted WESTPAC Marines in
the QOL data set. In Table 5-41, these Marines are grouped in
a bivariate contingency table. The ACC subgroup has an 80.0
percent frequency (summing: mostly pleased - 31.6 percent,
pleased - 3 8.9 percent, and delighted - 9.5 percent) of
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viewing their LAAW positively, to some extent, the UNACC
subgroup has a 60.0 percent frequency, and the SGL subgroup
has a 83.3 percent frequency.




















































































Note: Quantities for each cell appear in parentheses ().
The ANOVA test results are presented in Table 5-42.
This analysis of variance procedure indicates that there is a
statistically significant difference between the subgroups in
how they view their LAAW. The F Value is high - 7.03 - and
the Pr > F is low, .0011. Therefore, the null hypothesis can
be rejected and the alternate hypothesis is accepted.
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Square F Value Pr > F
Model 2 18.85412891 9.42706446 7 03 0.0011
Error 179 239.98103592 1.34067618
Corrected Total 181 258.83516484
R-Square C.V. Root MSE LIFEHH1 Mean
0.072842 22.56246 1.1578757 5.1318681
Source DF Anova SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F
STATUS 2 18.85412891 9.42706446 7.03 0.0011
The TUKEY test results are presented in Table 5-43.
This analysis indicates that there is a statistically
significant difference between married/unaccompanied and
married/accompanied Marines; also, there is a statistically
significant difference between married/unaccompanied and
single Marines. This means that the married/unaccompanied
Marines are significantly less pleased with their LAAW than
are married/accompanied and single Marines.
TABLE 5-43 CAREER ENLISTED MARINES' TUKEY
Tukey's Studentized Range (HSD) Test for variable> LIFEWH1
NOTE: This test controls the type I experimentwise error rate.
Alpha= 0.05 Confidences 0.95 df= 179 MSE= 1.340676
Critical Value of Studentized Range= 3.342






























The foregoing interpretations can be observed by:
first, referring to the "status comparison" column, where 1
corresponds to married/accompanied, 2 corresponds to
married/unaccompanied, and 3 corresponds to single (the left
margin) ; and, second, referring to the "***" on the right
margin. By reading horizontally and left to right, the status
comparison 2 - 1 and 2-3 in the left margin depicts a *** in
the right margin.
c. WESTPAC Officers
There are 40 WESTPAC officers in the QOL data set.
In Table 5-44, these Marines are grouped in a bivariate
contingency table. The ACC subgroup has a 90.4 percent
frequency (summing: mostly pleased - 28.6 percent, pleased -
42.8 percent, and delighted - 19.0 percent) viewing their LAAW
positively, to some extent, the UNACC subgroup has a 100.0
percent frequency, and the SGL subgroup has an 85.7 percent
frequency.
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Note: Quantities for each cell appear in parentheses ().
This analysis of variance procedure indicates that there is no
statistically significant difference between the subgroups in
how they view their LAAW. The F Value is low - 0.61 - and the
Pr > F is high, .5506. The TUKEY procedure is not performed
because the ANOVA procedure has indicated that the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected.






Square F Value Pr > F
Model 2 1 .21904762 0.60952381 0.61 0.5506
Error 37 37 .18095238 1.00489060
Corrected Total 39 38 .40000000
R-Squara C.V. Root MSE LIFEMH1 Mean
0.031746 17.28349 1.0024423 5.8000000
Source DF Anova SS Meen Square F Value Pr > F




The Intent to Stay in the Marine Corps
This section analyzes the effect a WESTPAC
unaccompanied tour has on a married Marine's intent to stay in
the Marine Corps. The hypothesis test for this analysis is
presented in Table 5-46. The null hypothesis is that the mean
values for "intent to stay in the Marine Corps" are equal for
married/accompanied, married/unaccompanied, and single
Marines. The alternative hypothesis is that the
married/unaccompanied Marine's mean value is different from
that of the married/accompanied and single Marines. The
WESTPAC Marines were divided into first -term enlisted, career
enlisted, and officer populations. These three population
groups are analyzed separately using the bivariate, ANOVA, and
(as required) TUKEY procedures.
TABLE 5-46 INTENT TO STAY IN THE MARINE CORPS HYPOTHESES
H : Meanacc = Mean^^ = Meansgl
Ha : Meanacc g Meanunacc g Meansgl
a. First -Term WESTPAC Marines
There are 346 first -term WESTPAC Marines in the QOL
data set. In Table 5-45, these Marines are grouped in a
bivariate contingency table that stratifies the Marines by two
characteristics, their accompanied/unaccompanied/single status











































Note: Quantities for each cell appear in parenthesesQ.
The "intend to stay" column presents the relative
frequency (or proportion) of Marines who intend to stay in the
Marine Corps by their accompanied (ACC) , unaccompanied
(UNACC), and single (SGL) status. The parenthetically
enclosed number is the quantity of Marines for that particular
row category. The ACC subgroup has a 22.2 percent frequency
of Marines who intend to stay in the Marine Corps, the UNACC
subgroup has a 25.9 percent frequency, and the SGL subgroup
has a 24.4 percent frequency.
The ANOVA test results are presented in Table 5-48.
This analysis of variance procedure indicates that there is no
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statistically significant difference between the three
subgroups in their intent to stay in the Marine Corps. A
statistical significance would be portrayed by an P Value (the
test statistic) of approximately 5 . or higher and a Pr > P of
0.05 or lower (the probability of making a Type I error) . In
this case, if the null hypothesis is rejected, there is a
.6836 probability that rejecting the null hypothesis is a
mistake. Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected;
and this indicates that there is no significant difference
between married/accompanied, married/unaccompanied, and single
Marines in the mean frequency at which they intend to stay in
the Marine Corps . The TUKEY procedure is not performed
because the ANOVA procedure has indicated that the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected.
TABLE 5-48 FIRST-TERM MARINES' INTEND TO STAY ANOVA





Squara F Value Pr > F
Model 2 0.48802754 0.24401377 0.38 0.6836
Error 343 219.75763720 0.64069282
Corrected Total 345 220.24566474
R-Square C.V. Root MSE STAYER Hun
0.002216 43.89062 0.8004329 1.8236994
Source DF Anova SS Mean Squara F Value Pr > F
STATUS 2 0.48802754 0.24401377 0.38 0.6836
Jb. Career Enlisted WESTPAC Marines
There are 182 career enlisted WESTPAC Marines in
the QOL data set. In Table 5-49, these Marines are grouped in
a bivariate contingency table. The ACC subgroup has an 89.5
93
percent frequency of Marines who intend to stay in the Marine
Corps, the UNACC subgroup has an 82.2 percent frequency, and
the SGL subgroup has an 81.0 percent frequency.







































Quantities for each cell appear in parentheses().
The ANOVA test results are presented in Table 5-50.
This analysis of variance procedure indicates that there is no
statistically significant difference between the subgroups in
their intent to stay in the Marine Corps. The F Value is low
- 0.85 - and the Pr > F is high, .4289. The TUKEY procedure
is not performed because the ANOVA procedure has indicated
that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
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Squara F Valua Pr > F
Modal 2 0.43556327 0.21778163 0.85 0.0289
Error 179 45.83366750 0.25605401
Corractad Total 181 46.26923077
R-Squara C.V. Root MSE STAYER Maan
0.009414 18.02255 0.5060178 2.8076923
Sourca DF Anova SS Mean Squara F Valua Pr > F
STATUS 2 0.43556327 0.21778163 0.85 0.4289
c. WESTPAC Officers
There are 40 WESTPAC officers in the QOL data set.
In Table 5-51, these Marines are grouped in a bivariate
contingency table. The ACC subgroup has a 100.0 percent
frequency of Marines who intend to stay in the Marine Corps,
the UNACC subgroup has an 80.0 percent frequency, and the SGL
subgroup has a 90.0 percent frequency.
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Quantities for each cell appear in parentheses().
The ANOVA test results are presented in Table
5-52. This analysis of variance procedure indicates that
there is no statistically significant difference between the
subgroups in their intent to stay in the Marine Corps. The F
Value is low - 2.72 - and the Pr > F is too high, .0789
(because this test is using a 0.05 significance standard).
The TUKEY procedure is not performed because the ANOVA
procedure has indicated that the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected.
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Squara F Valua Pr > F
Modal 2 0.81785714 0.40892857 2.72 0.0789
Error 37 5.55714286 0.15019305
Corractad Total 39 6.37500000
R-Squara C.V. Root MSE STAYER Maan
0.128291 13.47991 0.3875475 2.8750000
Sourca DF Anova SS Maan Squara F Valua Pr > F
STATUS 2 0.81785714 0.40892857 2.72 0.0789
3. The Analysis Review
It is appropriate to discuss the limitations of the
population groups: first- term enlisted, career enlisted, and
officer. First, the first-term enlisted Marine population is
affected by U.S. Marine Corps PCS policy that does not
authorize first- term married Marines to go to WESTPAC
accompanied by their dependents. Consequently, the low number
of married/accompanied first- term Marines reflects this
policy. The few married/accompanied first -term Marines are
either married to spouses they met in WESTPAC or they brought
their dependents at their own expense and are serving on a
one -year tour. Therefore, the comparison between the married/
unaccompanied and single Marines has the most emphasis for the
hypothesis testing. Second, the career enlisted Marine
population may have some bias regarding their intent to stay
in the Marine Corps because of their previous career decisions
to remain in the Marine Corps. This may affect the usefulness
of the "intent to stay in the Marine Corps" hypothesis test.
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Third, the officer population is limited by its small sample
size. A small sample makes it difficult to determine any-
statistical significance. Additionally, because of the small
sample size, first-term and career officers were not
separated, and their potentially different characteristics
regarding their "intent to stay in the Marine Corps" may harm
this analysis.
The following observations can be made regarding the "life
as a whole" and "intent to stay in the Marine Corp" hypothesis
testing:
• First -Term Marines: The analysis shows that married/
unaccompanied Marines do not view their life as a whole
and intent to stay in the Marine Corps any differently
than their peers. These observations are not consistent
with the literature review findings. This may mean that
these Marines have low expectations for family stability,
and a longer unaccompanied tour may not significantly harm
their quality of life and retention.
• Career Enlisted Marines: The analysis shows that the
married/unaccompanied Marines are significantly less happy
about their life as a whole when compared to their
married/accompanied and single Marine peers. This
observation parallels the literature review findings that
show family separation harms married Marines' morale.
However, there is no significant difference in how these
Marines view their intent to stay in the Marine Corps.
This may mean that career enlisted Marines have selected
to stay in the Marine Corps knowing full well that they
will experience family separation, and they accept the
paradigm of a one-year unaccompanied WESTPAC tour.
Changing the one -year WESTPAC tour to two years may
require a new paradigm for these Marines. Until they
accept a new paradigm their "life as a whole" may be
harmed further and retention may decrease.
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Officers: The officer sample was too small to make any-
significant observations about this Marine population.
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
This thesis analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of
altering Marine Corps rotational and operational PCS -move
policies. The objective of this analysis is to enable Marine
Corps decision makers to select options that effectively
reduce the PCS budget without degrading readiness . The
research was designed to answer these questions:
• What are the effects on the Marine Corps budget if: one,
unaccompanied rotational tour lengths are extended and,
two, operational tour lengths are extended?
• Other than the fiscal effects to the budget, what effect
will extended unaccompanied rotational tour lengths have
on readiness? and,
• What effect will extended operational tour lengths have on
readiness and career development?
This thesis uses a literature review and data analyses to
address these questions. Chapter II reviewed other authors'
literature in similar research areas. In Chapter V, analyses
were presented that provide answers to the thesis questions.




The literature review provides insight to the positive
and negative effects that may occur if unaccompanied
rotational tours and operational tours are extended. A longer
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rotational tour for single and married/unaccompanied Marines
will reduce personnel turbulence and may enhance unit
readiness. However, married/unaccompanied Marines' personal
readiness and retention may be harmed because of increased
family separation. Longer operational tours for career
officer and enlisted Marines will also reduce personnel
turbulence and thereby enhance unit cohesion and readiness.
However, a longer operational tour may harm officer career
development and to a lesser degree enlisted Marine career
development
.
2 . PCS Savings Estimates
All of the proposed PCS policy options reduce PCS
moves relative to the current, status quo, PCS policy. The
different options are presented below along with the estimated
savings
.
• All WESTPAC rotational one-year tours change to two years:
a $34.8 million savings.
• WESTPAC rotational one-year tours change to two years for
first- term Marines only: a $25.5 million savings.
• All (CONUS) operational tours (three-year and two-year)
change to four years: a $13.2 million savings.
• Operational tours change to four years for all career
officers and enlisted except those Marines in selected
billets: a $9.1 million savings.
3. PCS -Move Simulation Analysis
A PCS -move simulation was designed to evaluate how the
proposed PCS policy options affect Marine assignments. Using
the Markov Chain Model, simulations were run on the ground
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supply majors' population to compare current policy (the
status quo) , the WESTPAC option, and the CONUS option. The
WESTPAC option, changing all rotational one-year tours to two
years, had the least category shortages and overages. The
status quo option was the second best in limiting category
shortages and overages. The CONUS option, changing all
operational tours to four years, had the most category
shortages and overages.
4. WESTPAC One- Year Tour Analysis
This analysis studied the data obtained from the 1993
Marine Corps Quality (QOL) of Life Survey. WESTPAC officer,
career enlisted force, and first -term Marine populations were
defined and studied separately. For each population,
comparisons were made between married/accompanied,
married/unaccompanied, and single Marine subgroups based on
how they responded to questions that asked them about their
quality of life as a whole and intent to stay in the Marine
Corps. Of the three populations, only the married/
unaccompanied career enlisted force Marines significantly
viewed their life as a whole differently (less pleased with
their LAAW) . Also, the differences between these subgroups in
their intent to stay in the Marine Corps are not statistically
significant for any of the populations.
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B. CONCLUSIONS
The literature review and analysis results indicate that
conclusions can be made about the proposed changes to
rotational one-year tour and operational three-year tour
lengths. These results show that the proposed changes to PCS-
move policy can save money. Also, "readiness" can be harmed
and improved by imposing any one of the options, and some
options may be more harmful to readiness than others. One
problem is that these readiness impacts, both the positive and
negative ones, are difficult to quantify; but, we can surmise
that these effects will equate to a "net" positive or negative
effect to Marine Corps resources (i.e., PCS budget,
recruitment, retention, training, and family service
programs) . Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this
thesis to compute this net effect; but, the primary thesis
objective is to provide Marine Corps decision-makers with
sufficient results and recommendations to enable them to make
well-informed decisions.
1. Rotational One-Year Tours
The PCS savings estimate analysis shows that
substantial savings can be achieved by changing the one-year
tour to two years. For ground supply majors, the PCS -move
simulation shows that this policy change could provide the
most assignment stability. Also, first- term married/
unaccompanied Marines do not appear to be harmfully affected
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by their family separations. They view their "life as a
whole" and "intent to stay in the Marine Corps" relatively the
same as their single peers. Possibly, these junior Marines
have lower expectations about their "family life" in the
Marine Corps. However, a two-year unaccompanied tour will
probably harm the reenlistment rate for married first -term
Marines; but this may be an acceptable "cost" because of the
PCS budget savings. On the other hand, the quality of life
analysis shows that married/unaccompanied career enlisted
Marines are significantly less pleased with their life as a
whole when they are compared to their married/accompanied and
single peers. However, the way they view their life as a
whole does not impede their intent to stay in the Marine
Corps; but, then, the paradigm of a one -year unaccompanied
tour is probably part of their decision to stay in the Marine
Corps. Changing this one-year tour to two years for career
enlisted force Marines could harm retention unless a new
paradigm is accepted by all Marines facing career decisions.
Research limitations may affect inferences based on
the above conclusions. First, using an average PCS cost may
inadvertently inflate the savings estimates. Second, although
the PCS-move simulation indicates that changing the one-year
tours to two years improves how ground supply majors can
achieve assignment requirements, it is not known whether this
small subgroup is representative of all ranks and occupations.
Third, the WESTPAC officer sample used in the life as a whole
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and intent to stay in the Marine Corps analysis was hampered
by its size and the consequent pooling of senior and junior
officers. Therefore, the WESTPAC officer sample may be
unsuitable for statistical analysis because of sample size and
composition. However, a conclusion may be drawn based on
family separation research that the married/unaccompanied
officers may view their LAAW similarly to the career enlisted
force Marines.
2. Operational Four -Year Tours
The PCS savings estimate analysis shows that savings
can be achieved by changing the standard tour length to four
years. Also, the literature review reflects the potential
positive effects to unit cohesion and the morale of Marines
and their dependents. However, the PCS-move simulation
demonstrated that this option may exacerbate assignment
stability (i.e., create shortages in billets that have shorter
tour lengths and require a manipulation to fix the imbalance)
and thereby harm readiness. Therefore, although ceretis
paribus was imposed to evaluate rotational and operational PCS
move policy, in fact, the feasibility of extending the
operational tour length may not be wise because of the
secondary effects just described. Additionally, other
research indicates that officers' career development may be
harmed because fewer moves corresponds to fewer opportunities
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Data and analysis limitations were highlighted throughout
the analysis reviews in the previous chapter. These
limitations should be corrected before any decisions are made
to change PCS -move policy. Therefore, the following
recommendations are made to guide those analysts who will
pursue similar research questions with further study:
• Refine the WESTPAC rotational PCS -cost data. Obtain
average costs for the following: accompanied,
unaccompanied, and single officers; accompanied,
unaccompanied, and single career enlisted force Marines;
and, unaccompanied and single first -term Marines.
• Recompute rotational move cost estimates using the refined
PCS -cost data and the analysis methodologies applied in
this thesis.
• Evaluate, using a Markov Chain Model simulation to
determine the effects a four-year operational tour may
have on other grade/occupation officer and enlisted
communities
.
Also, given the analysis presented in this thesis and
further study in areas relating to the previous
recommendations, the following actions (and non-actions) are
recommended:




rotational one-year tour to two years for first- term
Marines only .
• Do not change the WESTPAC rotational one-year tour length
for officers or career enlisted force Marines.
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• Do not change the CONUS operational three -year tour length
unless analyses show that a longer operational tour will
not disrupt the PCS assignment process.
• Should a longer operational tour appear supportable,
consider changing the tour length for only career enlisted
Marines because the harm to their career development (and
readiness) is minimal.
• Do not change the CONUS operational three-year tour length
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